

REPORT ON OPERATION  
"BLACKCOCK"

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1 Corps District (5)

8 Corps District (5)

30 Corps District (5)

7 Armoured Division (4)

52 (L) Division (4)

43 Infantry Division (4)

79 Armoured Division (4)

6 Guards Tank Brigade

8 Armoured Brigade

1 Commando Brigade

HQ L of C

GHQ Troops

HQ GHQ AA Troops

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## OPERATION "BLACKCOCK"

12 CORPS. 15 - 26 JAN 45

Reference Maps 1/100,000 GS GS 4336, Sheets 4 and 9  
GS GS 4416, Sheet R1.

### P A R T I

#### INTRODUCTION

1. On 31 Dec 44, 12 Corps issued planning instructions which stated that there was a strong possibility that the Corps would have a chance of attacking the enemy on the GEILENKIRCHEN - ROERMOND front. The intention of the operation was to clear the enemy out of the area bounded by the Rivers ROER, WURM, the Corps' forward localities and the R MAAS. By so doing, the Corps front would be materially shortened and a corresponding economy of force effected.

2. The basis of the plan was to take advantage of the advanced position of the LEFT flank to break through the enemy positions in that sector and subsequently, by a succession of turning operations from the NORTH and WEST, to capture all the positions WEST of the ROER. It was considered that the conditions under which this plan was to be carried out should have the provisos that (a) the going should be suitable for the employment of FLAILS and armour and that there should be good prospects of the continuation of frosty conditions and (b) that the enemy positions should be weakly held, e.g. by NOT more than two Volksgrenadier Divs.

#### TOPOGRAPHY

3. Between the valley of the R WURM on the EAST and the JULIANA Canal on the WEST, there was one important water obstacle in front of our forward positions. This was the SAEFFELER BEEK. This stream is about 15 to 20 feet wide with marshy sides in places, and was reported to be an anti-tank obstacle, though it was believed tanks might get across in places, with difficulty. The main road bridge on the RIGHT, at HONGEN, had been blown. On the LEFT, it was appreciated that the numerous minor streams would present a series of bridging problems.

The chief roads in the area were the SITTARD - HONGEN - SAEFFELEN - HEINSBERG and the SITTARD - SUSTEREN - ROERMOND, both of which it would be essential to open up as quickly as possible.

The wooded areas in the CENTRE consisted of small copses very suitable for surprise and delaying actions. Here the country was gently undulating with the highest portion to be found around BOCKET.

#### ENEMY DEFENCES AND DISPOSITIONS (Diagram 1)

##### DEFENCES

4. In the triangular area SOUTH of the R ROER, the enemy had organised three lines of defences. Along the Southern side, the front line ran from LINDERN through WALDENRATH and HAVERT to ROOSTEREN, for the greater part of the way following the SAEFFELER BEEK. From ROOSTEREN the line turned NORTH along the JULIANA Canal and the R MAAS to ROERMOND.

.../It comprised

It comprised a line of trenches with weapon pits with trip-wires and mines in front.

5. A second line of trenches started in the SIEGFRIED LINE at UETTERATH and ran through BRAUNSRATH and WALDFEUCHT to link up with the JULIANA Canal positions near ECHT. This was a single line of trench with communication trenches leading off to the rear.

The third line consisted of a shorter length of trench which ran from DREMMEN to HAAREN covering the town of HEINSBERG.

6. These three lines hinged on that portion of the SIEGFRIED LINE lying SOUTH of the ROER. This was liberally supplied with pill-boxes which had been connected up by trenches. Generally, the area between LINNICH and HEINSBERG contained a mass of trenches, pill-boxes and gun positions, all intended to prevent an advance down the valley of the ROER.

7. ROERMOND itself had very strong all-round defences. SOUTH of the town there were two anti-tank ditches, with trenches on both sides of them, covered by wire obstacles. Near the JULIANA Canal, the villages of ECHT, SCHILBERG and MONTFORT were prepared for all round defence. Throughout the rest of the area strong points were made of the villages, hamlets and communication centres. These had been mostly community dug and sometimes bore little relation tactically to the configuration of the ground. Between these strong points the ground was covered by fire and strewn with mines and booby traps.

#### DISPOSITIONS

8. Two divs, organised on a Volksgrenadier basis, were disposed along the 12 Corps front. On the RIGHT, 183 Div with three regts and a fusilier bn was holding a front of about 9 miles. On the LEFT, 176 Div, also with three regts, and a fusilier bn, was stretched over a 19 mile sector. To the NORTH of this Div, it was believed that the ROERMOND area was held by Regt HUBNER.

183 Div was badly mauled in the fighting during Nov 44, and was withdrawn to be reformed, but it appeared that reinforcements had arrived fairly regularly. From PW statements a fair average of strength would be about 60 per rifle coy and 80 per heavy coy in both divs.

9. Owing to a recent renumbering and reorganisation of the arty units in the area, it was difficult to determine the number of guns on the front, but from all sources, it was estimated there might be a total of 90 field guns, 36 mediums and 18 x 7.5 cms, some of the latter probably SP.

#### WEATHER

10. The weather was extremely cold with light falls of snow. During the week before the operation there had been fairly hard frosts, sufficient to enable tanks to move across country provided there was no thaw. Roads were very slippery owing to their thin layers of frozen snow, and road movement was tricky. In the MAAS valley fogs were frequent. All tracked vehicles, and a number of others in the forward areas, were camouflaged white, and most of the forward troops were issued with white oversuits.

PLAN OF 12 CORPS (Diagram 1) For details see 12 CORPS OPERATION INSTRUCTION No.26 at Appendix 1.

#### TROOPS AVAILABLE

11. The following troops were available for the operation :-

.../7 Armd Div

7 Armd Div  
43 Inf Div  
52 (L) Inf Div  
6 Guards Tank Bde  
8 Armd Bde  
Supporting Arty (including 3 and 9 AGsRA)  
Supporting units of 79 Armd Div organised  
under 31 Tank Bde

XIII US Corps were to co-operate by providing arty support on the RIGHT of the Corps front, while 8 Brit Corps were to assist by deploying guns in the area of MAESEYCK to support attacks of 7 Armd Div.

#### TASKS

12. In outline the tasks of formations were as follows :-
- (a) 7 Armd Div was to start the attack by an assault on the area ANGEL and was then to capture BEAR. For this second objective it had 8 Armd Bde and one inf bde of 52 (L) Inf Div under command.
  - (b) When troops of 7 Armd Div were on or approaching their final objectives in phase BEAR, 52 (L) Inf Div in the CENTRE were to seize CROWN. A pause would then probably be necessary to allow the guns to move forward before
  - (c) 52 (L) Inf Div advanced to capture EAGLE and 7 Armd Div advanced to seize DOLPHIN. The estimated earliest time for this was the morning of D + 3.
  - (d) From now onwards the most probable course of events would be :-
    - (i) 43 Inf Div to capture HART, followed immediately by 52 (L) Inf Div to FLEECE and 7 Armd Div to GLOBE.
    - (ii) Immediately on capture of FLEECE, 43 Inf Div to seize JUG and then, in conjunction with XIII US Corps, to make good the KETTLE area.

D Day was fixed for 15 Jan. The advance on ANGEL was to start at last light.

#### PRELIMINARY MEASURES BEFORE D DAY

13. Prior to the operation, certain regroupings were necessary. On the RIGHT, 43 Inf Div relieved 52 (L) Inf Div who in turn relieved the Eastern sector of 7 Armd Div, the resulting dispositions being shown in Diagram 1. It was hoped that with two bdes of 43 Inf Div in the line, the enemy might be induced to believe that the main threat would come from the direction of GELLENKIRCHEN against DREMMEN and HEINSBERG.

14. It was considered essential to capture BAKENHOVEN (marked on Diagram 3) about one mile NW of SUSTEREN, in order that a bridge over a small stream to the SW of the village could be constructed before the operation proper began, and thereby secure a proper start line for the opening assault on DIETEREN.

This preliminary was successfully carried out on 15 Jan by one coy 1/5 QUEENS who were assisted through the minefield SOUTH of the village by FLAILS. The enemy counter attacked the village in some

.../strength and

strength and severe hand to hand fighting ensued, but the village was firmly held in spite of fairly heavy casualties.

RA

For details see RA 12 Corps Operation Instruction No. 38 at Appendix 2.

15. The various phases of the operation were to be supported by all guns in the Corps Arty which could be brought to bear under the orders of the CCRA. The weight of arty available for each phase was five to eight field regts, three to six medium regts, plus varying numbers of mountain guns, heavies, super heavies, and HAA guns.

Each div had its own div arty, its CS medium regt and one other medium regt at priority call throughout the operation for DF, also one tp of searchlights for movement light. One Mattress bty was available in the hands of the CCRA.

AIR

16. Briefly, attacks were to be supported by opportunity targets called for through TCLs; by softening of communication and reserve centres by medium bombers, and possibly by the use of smoke.

To isolate the battlefield, the maximum possible night intruder effort by single aircraft, and strong fighter armed reconnaissances by day, were to be laid on against certain roads and communication centres.

In addition, the enemy was to be harassed by the bombing of Headquarters and reserve localities.

No reliance, however, was to be placed on the availability of air support, and the operation would proceed as planned whether flying was possible or not.



P A R T II

7 ARMD DIV

See Map and Diagram I

TASKS

17. The tasks given to 7-Armd Div were as follows :-
- (a) To seize the area SCHILBERG 7079 - ECHT 6970 and establish a Class 40 route thence from SITTARD.  
Codeword ANGEL.
  - (b) To seize the area WALDFEUCHT 7775 - BOCKET 7874 - KONINGSBOSCH 7574.  
Codeword BEAR.
  - (c) To seize the area MONTFORT 7582 - LINNE 7485.  
Codeword DOLPHIN.
  - (d) To seize the area POSTERHOLT 8181 - ST ODILIENBERG 7984.  
Codeword GLOBE.
18. Apart from enemy opposition and weather conditions, which are described elsewhere, two main factors contrived to make the operation one of considerable difficulty.

(a) Traffic Control

Roads were limited and to a certain extent unknown quantities. All were intersected by numerous minor water courses and it was appreciated that all major bridges, and a number of culverts also, would be blown by the enemy as he withdrew. Owing to ground conditions cross country movement could not be relied upon. In consequence a most comprehensive traffic plan had to be initiated in order to ensure that the two main axes, the roads SITTARD - SCHILBERG and SITTARD - LIMBRICHT 6770 - BORN 6471 - HOLTUM 6673 - GEBROEK 6575 - BAKENHOVEN 6676 - DIETEREN 6777, were used to maximum advantage as soon as they were cleared by the leading troops and the bridges constructed behind them. This was effected by setting up a series, finally some ten in all, of TCPPs each manned by an officer drawn from units within the div. Each had a wireless set and was on a traffic net controlled throughout by a special officer sitting in the G (Ops) Room at Main HQ Div. No vehicles were allowed to proceed in any direction without reference to this officer. This system proved its worth throughout the operation and all traffic problems were quickly settled without confusion.

(b) RE

The problem here was almost entirely a bridging one. The speed of the advance entirely depended upon the speed of construction of the numerous crossings. Careful preliminary planning to ensure adequate bridging material in the right place at the right time, and continuously hard and exacting work by the RE personnel, often under heavy fire, solved the difficulty. The icebound roads and indifferent approaches to the bridge sites made the work all

.../the more

the more difficult. On more than one occasion a bridge completed under fire was destroyed by a tank, or other heavy vehicle, skidding on the approach and crashing the bridge and work had to start all over again.

19. Outline Plan

The plan of Commander 7 Armd Div to carry out the tasks given is described briefly below. (For full details see extracts of 7 Armd Div Operation Instruction - attached Appendix 3).

Task ANGEL

- (a) This was divided into three phases called ANGEL I, ANGEL II, and ANGEL III, to be carried out by 131 Lorried Inf Bde grouped as under:

1/5 QUEENS  
2 DEVONS  
9 DLI  
1 R Tks  
One sqn less one tp LOTHIAN and BORDER YEO (Flails)  
One sqn 141 RAC (Crocodiles)  
258 Bty NY  
Two tps 1 Cdn Armd Personnel Carrier Regt (Kangaroos)  
One TCL.

ANGEL I

The task was to establish a bridgehead across the VLOED BEEK (See footnote) and capture DIETEREN.

ANGEL II

The task was to establish a firm base in the area SCHILBERG - ECHT.

ANGEL III

The task was to clear SUSTEREN 6875 from the NW and assist the RE to open a Class 40 route SITTARD - SCHILBERG.

Task BEAR

- (b) This task was to be carried out by 8 Armd Bde, grouped as below, under command 7 Armd Div, directly the Class 40 route SITTARD - SCHILBERG was completed, via SCHILBERG. On completion of this task this formation was to pass under command 52 (L) Inf Div.

4/7 DG.  
13/18 H  
12 KRRC less one coy  
155 Inf Bde (52 (L) Inf Div)  
147 Field Regt RA  
Two pls Corps Tps RE  
222 Assault Sqn RE less one tp and including two assault bridges  
One SP Bty 86 A tk Regt  
One Sqn LOTHIAN and BORDER YEO less one tp (Flails)  
1 Cdn Armd Personnel Carrier Regt less two tps (Kangaroos)  
One TCL

Note:- The VLOED BEEK is not named on the Map Sheet, but is shown on Diagram 3. It runs between MILLER 6971 and NIEUWSTAD 6872, and NIEUWSTAD and SUSTEREN 6775.

.../(c) Task DOLPHIN

Task DOLPHIN

- (c) The Corps task was modified to the seizing of a firm base area MONTFORT. This task was to be carried out by 22 Armd Bde with the following units :-

8 H  
5 R Tks  
1 RB less one coy  
One Bn Inf (later proved to be 9 DLI)  
260 Bty NY

Task GLOBE

- (d) The Corps task was amplified to include the destruction of all enemy in area POSTERHOLT - ST ODILLENBERG - LINNE - MAASBRACHT 7085. The task to be carried out by 22 Armd Bde after regrouping if necessary as a result of Task DOLPHIN.
- (e) During ANGEL, 22 Armd Bde, with 5 DG and one coy 1 RB were made responsible for maintaining a firm base in the area NIEUWSTAD 6872 - HOLTUM 6573, and, if possible, to cover RE bridging operations up the SITTARD - SCHILBERG road as far as the VLOED BEEK 6774.
- (f) The 11 H under command Div, were to maintain one sqn in area ROOSTEREN 6577 to prevent enemy infiltration between the R MEUSE and the JULIANA Canal, and, later the rest of the Regt were to recce in front of 22 Armd Bde during tasks DOLPHIN and GLOBE.

NARRATIVE

20. Task ANGEL I

- (a) This operation was due to start at 2100 hours 15 Jan. The time was so selected in order to allow the preliminary bridging of the VLOED BEEK to be done during the night. However, weather conditions became so bad and a thaw having set in, it was decided at a visit of the Corps Commander to HQ 7 Armd Div during the afternoon to postpone the operation until 0730 hours the next morning.
- (b) Troops
- 9 DLI  
One Coy 1/5 QUEENS (the coy in BAKENHOVEN)  
One MMG pl 3 Coy NF  
One tp 258 A tk Bty  
B Sqn LOTHIAN and BORDER YEO (Flails)
- (c) There was little opposition, except mortar fire, in the early stages and the objective, DIETEREN, was secured by 1045 hours some twenty five PW being taken.
- (d) The remainder of the day and the whole of the night 16/17 Jan was spent in constructing the all important bridges. The main one over the VLOED BEEK 6676 was constructed after some twelve hours of arduous work in impossible conditions. Enemy shellfire was intense and accurate. Casualties to RE personnel were considerable and two bulldozers were knocked out. The enemy counter attacked this site during the night from the woods to the SOUTH

.../but were

but were beaten off chiefly by the spirited action of one Flail tank which found itself on the NORTH side of the BEEK and had to harbour there alone all night. Eventually this bridge was destroyed by a direct hit. A new site had to be found and eventually crossings were established a few hundred yards to the SE, but not completed until some hours after first light on 17 Jan. In addition during this night the approaches to the bridge constructed SOUTH of BAKENHOVEN on 13 Jan became impassable and a new bridge was erected. The first two bridges on the main SITTARD - SUSTEREN road were constructed after slight enemy opposition had been successfully dealt with by the coy of 1 RB sent out to cover these crossings.

21. Task ANGEL III

- (a) Owing to the difficulty being experienced in effecting the bridging over the VLOED BEEK, the Div Commander decided, on the evening of 16 Jan, that ANGEL III was to take place before ANGEL II. The number of tracked vehicles involved in the latter phase made it most desirable that the crossings be complete and secure before it should be launched. This was not the case with regard to ANGEL III and time therefore would be saved by putting this phase first.

(b) Troops

1/5 QUEENS  
One Sqn 1 R Tks  
One Tp 258 A tk Bty  
Three WASPS

- (c) At 0600 hours 17 Jan, 1/5 QUEENS were sent over the VLOED BEEK on foot and they reached their forming up area for the attack on SUSTEREN, in a Cement Works some thousand yards NW of this village on the road to DIETEREN, without much enemy interference. The attack on SUSTEREN opened at 0630 hours and they reached the Northern outskirts without difficulty. There, however, they were halted by the activities of two SP guns and two tanks. This was followed very quickly by a German counter attack of bn strength supported by tanks and SP guns. Very hard fighting ensued and the QUEENS were hard put to it to retain their positions but did so successfully. The situation eased when a sqn of 1 R Tks, which had been put over the VLOED BEEK, at a bulldozed crossing, came to their assistance about an hour later. The action to take the village continued slowly against determined opposition, particularly from the area of the railway NE of the place. By 1500 hours all except a small quarter to the SE was in our hands. Some sixty or more PW were captured in this action which was extremely hard fought throughout.

22. Task ANGEL II

- (a) The move up for this phase started at 1045 hours 17 Jan. At this time the bridges were still not complete, but it was decided that rather than wait longer and so impose further delay on the operations as a whole, the risks would be taken of putting the heavy vehicles over the bulldozed crossing which had already sufficed for the two tps of 1 R Tks on their way to join 1/5 QUEENS.

.../Troops

(b) Troops

2 DEVON  
 1 R Tks less one sqn  
 One MMG pl 3 Coy NF  
 One tp 258 A tk Bty  
 Two tps 1 Cdn Armd Personnel Carrier Regt  
 (Kangaroos)  
 One sqn 141 RAC (Crocodiles)

This group was organised so that equivalent columns could be sent up from DIETEREN, one on the main road DIETEREN - SUSTEREN - SCHILBERG and the second on the road DIETEREN - OPHOVEN 6879 - ECHT. In addition there was a third, reserve, column to be used as opportunity offered.

- (c) The start line, in the DIETEREN area, was not crossed until 1530 hours. The delay was caused by the very bad going for the heavy vehicles, and by the presence of a certain number of mines in the start line area. The LEFT column, on the route DIETEREN - OPHOVEN - ECHT, went well almost entirely across country. The going was bad, only tracked vehicles could make it, and a number of these became bogged. The enemy put up considerable resistance in OPHOVEN but this was overcome and by 1830 hours the forward coys were firmly established in the NW edge of ECHT after hard fighting. The whole of ECHT was in our hands by midnight. Meanwhile the RIGHT column, intending to move up the main SUSTEREN - SCHILBERG road, was quickly held up by determined enemy opposition, NE of SUSTEREN. The enemy held a road block where the road and railway cross, and were in some strength along the railway embankment to the SOUTH of it. Our own tanks found it impossible to manoeuvre off the road in this area, and were unable to counter the well sited enemy SP guns. Fighting continued in this area for the rest of the day, all night and well into the morning of 18 Jan.
- (d) In the meantime several items of importance had taken place. During the afternoon 5 KOSB (from 155 Inf Bde of 52 (L) Inf Div) had been placed under command 131 Inf Bde in order to clear OUDROOSTEREN 6677, and to take over DIETEREN from 9 DLI allowing the latter to come into Bde reserve. It was essential to clear OUDROOSTEREN in order to protect the LEFT flank of the Div. The task was completed by 1800 hours against slight opposition and thirty five PW were captured. The main road bridge over the VLOED BEEK, SOUTH of SUSTEREN was completed by 1700 hours and the 1/5 QUEENS from the NORTH and the 1 RB from the SOUTH had linked up by 2050 hours. By 0300 hours on 18 Jan the last bridge SOUTH of SUSTEREN was complete, and the road open to that point.
- (e) During the night the reserve column, mentioned in (b) above, was sent up the LEFT route into ECHT. At 0630 hours on 18 Jan 2 DEVON attacked SCHILBERG from ECHT with the assistance of Crocodiles. Some initial success was achieved but the enemy opposition was strong. It was not until the afternoon that this village was cleared. 9 DLI, less one coy sent to reinforce the RIGHT column of 2 DEVON in its attempt to clear the main road, had been sent up the LEFT route to ECHT, so relieving additional troops of 2 DEVON for the final clearing of SCHILBERG and also HILBERG 7180.

.../(f) In order

- (f) In order to assist the advance of the RIGHT column a two company attack by 5 KOSB was laid on to take the enemy position on the railway embankment and HEIDE 6976. This was successful by 1515 hours, the enemy withdrawing in a North Easterly direction. The road block by the road and railway crossing was finally cleared at 1230 hours and the advance of the RIGHT column up the road continued, but slowly as there was continual harassing by enemy SP guns, and hastily scattered mines had to be cleared.
- (g) The RIGHT column of 2 DEVON eventually linked up with the rest of the unit in SCHILBERG during the night 18/19 Jan and the main road from SITTARD was opened. This unit successfully beat off two strong enemy counter attacks from the EAST and NE during the night. The enemy on both occasions consisted of some hundred infantry backed by SP guns.

### 23. Task BEAR

- (a) The plan for this phase entailed movement up the main SITTARD - SCHILBERG road and then a right wheel in order to capture the objective from the WEST. The force was organised into four columns. Red and Black columns were the main striking forces to seize WALDFEUCHT and KONINGSBOSCH respectively: Brown column was to provide LEFT flank protection, and Green column was the formation reserve. Having left the main road SITTARD - SCHILBERG columns were to move by the routes as shewn on Diagram 3.
- (b) The major units in each column were as follows :-

#### RED

13/18 H (less one sqn)  
7/9 RS (in Kangaroos)  
One tp Flails  
One tp AVRE  
One pl 262 Coy RE  
One tp 129 A Tk Bty

#### BLACK

4/7 DG (less one sqn)  
4 KOSB  
A Coy 12 KRRC  
One tp Flails  
One tp AVRE  
One pl 262 Coy RE  
129 A Tk Bty less one tp

#### BROWN

One Sec Honey tanks  
One sqn 13/18 H  
B Coy 12 KRRC  
Det from A Tk guns 12 KRRC

#### GREEN

One sqn 4/7 DG  
12 KRRC (less three coys  
and det from A Tk guns)  
5 KOSB  
8 Armd Bde Tac HQ  
HQ 155 Inf Bde

- (c) Black column started moving up at 1400 hours on 18 January and had orders to establish a firm base in the area SLEK 7077 and then to push down Black route. Owing to traffic congestion and the necessity for considerable adm movement up the main road, it was decided that no other column of 8 Armd Bde would start before the morning of 19 Jan. During the night Black column with sub-units of 4/7 DG in the van, advanced at a good pace and eventually entered KONINGSBOSCH by first light. Considerable opposition was encountered, some fifty PW were taken and two SP guns were knocked out. The enemy showed considerable enterprise in the wooded area NW of KONINGSBOSCH by running out on to the tracks in the gaps between Black columns vehicles, scattering mines, and then darting back to the woods.

...(d)/Brown

- (d) Brown and Red columns were on the move by 0930 hours 19 Jan, but instead of going up to SCHILBERG and then turning EAST they were sent down Black route to the Western edge of the wooded area and thence NORTH to their own routes. This was in order to avoid a known enemy road block and mines in the area of SCHILBERG - WALDFEUCHT road crossing of the PEPINUS BEEK 7377. At 1140 hours Red column was held up at BOLVEN 7176 by SP fire from the area KLOOSTER LILBOSCH 7277. An attack was put in against this place, and it was finally cleared by 1510 hours. Confused fighting continued for the rest of the day against stiff opposition from small parties of enemy inf backed by SP guns. The ground permitted very little movement for the tanks off the roads, and the whole area was liberally sprinkled with mines. The lack of inf was felt at this stage of the battle which was quite unsuitable for the armour, tied as it was, to the few cleared tracks. By the evening the leading elements of Black and Red columns were established in the general wooded area NORTH and EAST of KONINGSBOSCH. A link up had been made with elements of 52 (L) Inf Div advancing NE from LIND 7272 and a firm base established astride the track running along the Western edge of the woods. During the night, it having been appreciated that 8 Armd Bde was unlikely to achieve further success on the present axes of advance, the formation was pulled back to the SITTARD - SCHILBERG road, sent SOUTH and then around to the area SAEFFELLEN 7571. It left behind in the area already gained the firm base on the Western edge of the wooded area and all leading elements to the EAST of this. On completion of the move 8 Armd Bde and attached troops went under command 52 (L) Inf Div.

24. During the afternoon 19 Jan, one tp 3 Commando from WEST of the R MEUSE, raided and cleared STEVENSWEEDE 6783, and during the night 19/20 Jan, 1/5 QUEENS moved from SUSTEREN to take over RIGHT flank protection in the area SLEK - HEIDE from 5 KOSB who departed with the rest of 155 Inf Bde to revert to command 52 (L) Inf Div. 5 DG were placed under command 131 Inf Bde to hold SUSTEREN in replacement of 1/5 QUEENS.

25. Task DOLPHIN

- (a) It was decided at midday on 19 Jan that this phase should begin the next day, 9 DLI being placed under command 22 Armd Bde for this task. H hour was fixed for 1430 hours, the whole morning being spent on the move up to the area SCHILBERG - ECHT. Also on this morning, 3 Commando came under command 7 Armd Div and was placed by them under command 131 Inf Bde. Their task was to operate NORTH from ECHT and so protect the LEFT flank of 22 Armd Bde in conjunction with patrols from one sqn 11 H.
- (b) The first objective for 22 Armd Bde was the capture of ST JOOST 7181. The troops detailed for this operation were two coys 1 RB supported by Crocodiles, and one sqn 8 H. It was anticipated that this village would be cleared comparatively easily and that the real objective of this phase, MONTFORT, could be proceeded with without delay. This was proved a false premise. The enemy fought long, doggedly and skilfully for this long straggling village and it was not until 1930 hours 21 Jan, some twenty nine hours after the initial advance began, that we could claim it firmly to be ours. It was the hardest fought battle of all in this operation. There were some two hundred enemy inf and a number of SP guns in the village to start with, and this force was kept well up to this strength by reinforcements from Regt HUBNER brought down from the ROERMOND 7889

.../area during

area during the evening 20 Jan. These were all fresh tps which ours, by this time, were not.

Initially some success was achieved and a footing was gained in some of the houses in the Southern end of the village and a number of PW were taken. The enemy continued to fight with tenacity, defending each house and from cleverly sited trench positions. Had weather and ground conditions been better it is more than probable that we could have bounced this objective as we had done others during the advance. As it was, the armour could not manoeuvre and was forced almost entirely to stick to the road approaches, and the enemy's cleverly managed SP gun screen in the wooded area EAST of the village gave more than adequate support to his inf. He made a strong point of the important road junction in the middle of the village. By nightfall little further progress had been made. At 2000 hours one coy 9 DLI was committed and after much confused fighting the road junction was seized. But the enemy infiltrated back into the houses in the Southern end of the village, and were still holding the Northern end, so that this coy was virtually cut off. At 0200 hours 21 Jan a further coy 9 DLI was sent in to try and clear from the SOUTH to join up with the first coy but this failed. During the fighting up to this stage 8 H had lost some eight tanks (some only receiving minor damage). Further attacks were launched on 21 Jan. The chief trouble was the lack of sufficient or fresh inf. Our troops had by this time been fighting for five days almost continuously in the severest of winter conditions. The battle was undoubtedly an inf task and the armour could assist very little. The final effort was made at 1700 hours and supported again by Crocodiles with the tanks of 8 H giving as much fire support as possible. This time it was successful and the village was entirely cleared by 1930 hours. Both sides suffered heavy casualties in this battle. 9 DLI had over sixty and the enemy left many dead in the village and three SP guns knocked out.

26. After the battle of ST JOOST regrouping was essential before 22 Armd Bde continued the advance on MONTFORT and certain changes of plan, as regards the future action in task GLOBE took shape. 1 Commando Bde came under command 7 Armd Div on the morning 22 Jan. Briefly the plan now was for 22 Armd Bde to advance on MONTFORT in two columns on routes as shown on Diagram 3, attached, whilst later 131 Inf Bde would advance Eastwards astride the SCHILBERG - WALDFEUCHT road to protect the RIGHT flank of 22 Armd Bde. In addition 1 Commando Bde, operating from ECHT was to advance NORTH in the direction of LINNE.

#### Regrouping

##### 131 Inf Bde

- 2 DEVON (from SCHILBERG to take over firm base in area ST JOOST)
- 9 DLI (from ST JOOST to SLEK to take over firm base area for 131 Inf Bde from 1/5 QUEENS)
- 8 H (to find patrols forward EAST and NORTH from ST JOOST with the rest of the Regt in SCHILBERG).

1 R Tks

##### 22 Armd Bde

- 5 DG
- 5 R Tks
- 1 RB
- 1/5 QUEENS



27. Patrols of 8 H moving EAST from ST JOOST, and from 11 H moving NE from the general line of the road running SE to NW through SLEK, acted vigorously all day. Some enemy opposition was encountered, but the chief trouble was a profusion of mines. Both bridges, on the routes to be used by 22 Armd Bde, across the BEEK some five hundred yards to the WEST of MONTFORT were found blown. The Northern one was repaired by 1700 hours, and the other by 2030 hours. Using the Northern route, tps of 22 Armd Bde attempted to enter AANDENBURG but were bitterly opposed. Heavy fighting continued in this area all night and on 23 Jan. It was not until 2 DEVON had swept through the woods from the NORTH and had linked up with 1/5 QUEENS, that this village was captured early on 24 Jan.

28. On the morning 23 Jan 1 Commando Bde supported by one sqn 8 H was ordered to advance from ECHT and seize MAASBRACHT 7185 and BRACHTERBEEK 7284. The advance started at 0800 hours, and by 0945 hours MAASBRACHT was captured against only slight opposition, by 1330 hours BRACHTERBEEK also.

29. The enemy, probably from LINNE, were seen moving SOUTH through the woods with the obvious intention of trying to cut the Northern route used by 22 Armd Bde between ST JOOST and AANDENBURG. 2 DEVON placed under command 22 Armd Bde was ordered forward from ST JOOST to clear the wooded area, and 8 H were ordered to take over the firm base area vacated by 2 DEVON. 1 Commando Bde was also ordered to exercise pressure from MAASBRACHT South Eastwards towards the railway.

30. The progress of 2 DEVON was slow through the heavily wooded country and it was not until after dark that they reached the line of the MONTFORT - LINNE road NORTH of AANDENBURG. They then wheeled SOUTH and by first light 24 Jan had linked up with 1/5 QUEENS in that village. Meanwhile 1 Commando Bde pushed patrols out towards LINNE and also SE towards the station 7384. In the former case a small but valuable bridgehead was established over the BEEK, which runs NW from the station, in between the wood and the small hamlet of DE VILLA 7385. An attempt to capture the station failed against stiff opposition.

31. At first light on 24 Jan 1/5 QUEENS from AANDENBURG attacked and cleared MONTFORT, their rear being secured by 2 DEVON, and linked up with the coy of 1 RB which had been advancing on the Southern of the two routes from ST JOOST. There was little opposition.

After this attack further regrouping was necessary before the next advance, to be undertaken by 131 Inf Bde, to PUTBROEK 7780; MONTFORT was taken over by 2 DEVON and 1/5 QUEENS brought back to SCHILBERG to act as a reserve for 131 Inf Bde. The axis given for the latter was the road SCHILBERG - ECHTERBOSCH 7676 and thence NORTH through DIERGAARDE 7577. The leading elements for this advance were to consist of 9 DLI and 1 R Tks preceded by 11 H under Div control.

32. At first light on 24 Jan 1 Commando Bde seized the station area unopposed, and started their attack to take LINNE. Initially some success was achieved and the SW corner of the village was entered. No further advance however could be made against determined opposition which included at least one SP gun and a Mk IV tank. By 1100 hours WEERD 7386 was occupied by the sqn 8 H supporting 1 Commando Bde. Attacks continued against LINNE most of the day, the last going in at last light but again without avail. It was not until the next morning, 25 Jan, that success was achieved here and the village was reported clear at 1015 hours. The Commandos fought with great vigour throughout and though receiving a number of casualties they inflicted far more upon the enemy. The Commandos, although quite undeterred thereby, were handicapped in their task by the lack of the full equipment and weapons to be found within the inf bns.

33. The advance by 131 Inf Bde started as planned at 1300 hours 24 Jan and by 1600 hours leading elements of 1 R Tks had entered PUTBROEK against some opposition consisting of the ubiquitous SP guns and the invariable mines, and lost three tanks in the action. By first light on 25 Jan the village was firmly held by two coys 9 DLI and a sqn of 1 R Tks.

34. By first light 25 Jan the front line situation was as follows :-

- |                       |   |
|-----------------------|---|
| <u>131 Inf Bde</u>    | (a) Elements of 9 DLI and 1 R Tks in PUTBROEK with patrols of 11 H to the NORTH, EAST and SOUTH.                      |
|                       | (b) The remainder of 9 DLI and 1 R Tks in AANDENBERG 7679.  |
| <u>22 Armd Bde</u>    | (c) 1 RB and 5 DG in MONTFORT and to the SOUTH.   |
|                       | (d) 2 DEVON and 5 R Tks in AANDENBERG 7482, with patrols to the NORTH and NW linking up 6 Commando SE of the station. |
| <u>1 Commando Bde</u> | (e) 6 Commando near BRACHTERBEEK with patrols to the NORTH.   |
|                       | (f) 3 Commando in DE VILLA with patrols towards LINNE.  |
|                       | (g) 45 Commando in MAASBRACHT.  |
|                       | (h) One tp 8 H in WEERD.  |

35. Orders for the day (25 Jan) consisted briefly for a comb through the heavily wooded area EAST of the line PUTBROEK - MONTFORT. 131 Inf Bde were to recce with a view to seizing POSTERHOLT and REUTJEN 7982, and 22 Armd Bde to clear the Northern edge of the woods and recce towards ST ODILLENBERG. The orders for 3 Commando to seize LINNE have already been dealt with.

Most of the opposition to 131 Inf Bde and 22 Armd Bde on this day came from small isolated pockets of enemy inf who had not managed to withdraw with their main sub-units and they did not offer much resistance. Mines were encountered and all small water crossings were demolished. 1/5 QUEENS (131 Inf Bde) succeeded in making a rough bridge just SOUTH of REUTJEN with civilian assistance and entered that village unopposed. One small patrol of 11 H, on foot, entered POSTERHOLT from the NORTH and took two PW. Information from these PW and from civilians indicated that there were still some thirty enemy in the Southern end. The village was heavily mined, and one of the two PW had been engaged in laying them. He promised to assist in taking them up again when we decided to occupy the place and eventually did so. 22 Armd Bde had similar success on the LEFT. By last light the whole wooded area was clear and patrols of 5 R Tks had pushed NORTH to within a few hundred yards of ST ODILLENBERG which was still occupied.

36. On 26 Jan, 9 DLI cleared the POSTERHOLT area and 1/5 QUEENS attacked and captured REUTJEN. It now remained to clear the enemy from the WEST side of the R ROER in the ST ODILLENBERG and PAARLO areas. 22 Armd Bde advanced with 2 DEVON and 5 DG to clear ST ODILLENBERG and subsequently established a forward patrol base with two coys 1 RB which enabled them to dominate the enemy position to the NORTH of the river. 1/5 QUEENS advanced on the orders of 131 Inf Bde and cleared the close country around HOLST and PAARLO establishing coys in both places. The

situation now was that all the bridges across the ROER capable of taking wheeled or tracked vehicles, with the exception of a trestle bridge near ROERMOND had been blown. The enemy still held a small bridgehead at VLODROP 8382 which it was decided not to attack on account of the open nature of the ground on our side of the river and because it was completely dominated from the German positions to the NORTH of the river.

37. Final regrouping took place shortly after this to hold the sector with 131 Inf Bde RIGHT and 1 Commando Bde LEFT. 22 Armd Bde was in reserve. Each of the forward bdes had one armd regt under command. The main line ran POSTERHOLT - REUTJEN - MONTFORT - AANDENBURG - LINNE. Strong patrol bases were maintained at PAARLO and ST ODILLENBERG and active patrolling and sniping kept the Germans confined to their small bridgehead at VLODROP and to their positions in the switch line between LEEROP 7786 and the factory SOUTH of MERUM 7687.

38. (a) Casualties within the Div throughout the operation amounted to a little over four hundred. This includes a number of PW lost during the enemy counter attack during the preliminary operation at BAKENHOVEN, and to the coy which at one stage was virtually cut off at ST JOOST.
- (b) Casualties to armour were comparatively light. Total losses amounted to ten tanks. Other casualties consisted of three damaged by enemy action and twenty three through mechanical defect repairable in Bde or Unit Workshops. Seven damaged by enemy action and repairable in 3rd or 4th line workshops.
- (c) During the period 16 - 26 Jan the Div captured six officers and four hundred and eighty four other ranks PW.



P A R T    III

52 (L) INF DIV

See Map and Diagram 3

OUTLINE PLAN

39. (a) The ultimate intention of the Div was to open the road SITTARD - HEINSBERG, (making it a Class 40 route), and to clear the enemy from the WEST bank of the R ROER between inclusive HEINSBERG and exclusive POSTERHOLT 8181.

The first objective of the Div, (known as phase "CROWN I" and "CROWN II"), was to seize the BREBEREN 7771 - ISENBRUCH 6972 line including the village of SCHALBRUCH. This phase was scheduled to start at first light on D + 2. Previous to this, (D Day and D + 1), 7 Armd Div had to seize ECHT and SCHILBERG 7079 and follow it up by capturing WALDFEUCHT - BOCKET - KONINGSBOSCH 7574 area. For this latter area 155 Inf Bde and 8 Armd Bde were under command of 7 Armd Div. If either of the above operations got behind schedule, the BREBEREN - ISENBRUCH line was to be captured by 52 (L) Inf Div irrespective of the progress made by 7 Armd Div.

- (b) The second objective, (known as phase "EAGLE"), of the Div was the HAAREN 7977 - BRAUNSRATH 8174 area. (7 Armd Div were first to capture MONTFORT 7482 - LINNE 7485).
- (c) The third objective (known as phase "FLEECE"), for the Div was to seize the area KARKEN 8379 - KEMPEN 8578 - HEINSBERG 8575 - KIRCHOVEN 8376.
- (d) The timings of the attack on the second and third objectives were to be dependent on the development of the situation.

On 13 Jan 45, 52 (L) Inf Div issued Operation Instruction No.4. Copy of this is attached at Appendix 4. (It includes certain amendments and alterations which were published subsequent to the issue of the Operation Instruction and it also includes the grouping of formations and units at the start of the operation. Codewords for villages, roads, rivers etc which were published with this Operation Instruction have been omitted).

COURSE OF THE OPERATION

40. On 17 Jan the Div Commander had a final conference at his HQ. It appeared that 8 Armd Bde would probably not secure their objective in the WALDFEUCHT - BOCKET - KONINGSBOSCH area and the Div Commander stated that this would not delay the start of the Div part of the operation and that he now placed rather more importance on linking up with 7 Armd Div on the LEFT flank than heretofore. Met forecast was most unpropitious indicating that the thaw which had already started that day would probably continue. The armd commanders however were optimistic over the use of their armd vehicles.

41. 18 Jan. The attack which had been preceded by heavy arty concentrations from the Div and Corps arty on the main enemy defence line and gun areas, started at 0630 hours. The first object was to secure a path through the enemy minefields and put two assault bridges across the SAEFFLER BEEK close to the village of STEIN. 156 Inf Bde, (with one additional bn from 157 Inf Bde), had been given the task of capturing the BREBEREN - ISENBRUCH line (inclusive SCHALBRUCH). The Bde had two

.../sqns SRY

sqns SRY under command and were supported by Flails, Crocodiles, and an RE coy together with one tp of 16 Assault Sqn RE with two assault bridges.

By 0843 one assault bridge was in position and inf were assaulting the villages of LIND and STEIN. Unfortunately the thaw had a very detrimental effect on armd movement. Only three tanks got across the assault bridge and almost immediately got bogged. Previously in the approach the other assault bridge tank had got temporarily bogged and this second bridge could not be got into position till 1030 hours. In addition three Flail tanks got mined and other support tanks got bogged, which was due to the state of the ground resulting from the thaw. The villages of STEIN and LIND took some time to capture. The RSF, who were carrying out this task suffered comparatively heavy casualties, (75), because of the skilful house to house defence and use of cellars by the enemy. Each house was connected to its neighbour by a communication trench - and the enemy were able to dart from house to house with comparative impunity, firing bursts of small arms here and there. A few Germans in this way threw some grenades amongst our wounded lying in the street. These particular Germans were quickly killed. If the support tanks and Crocodiles as planned had been able to accompany the inf, our casualties would not nearly have reached the above dimensions.

With the bridgehead thus established, 156 Inf Bde were able to fan out. HAVERT was cleared by midday and by dark our troops were established in HEILDER (6 CAMERONIANS), and SCHALBRUCH (5 HLI). An effective smokescreen was laid on HONGEN while these operations were in progress. It was carried out by the mortar platoon of 6 HLI who fired 11,000 rounds of smoke during the day. In addition, valuable support was given by our arty throughout the day. Owing to the thaw it was impossible to get any wheeled or tracked vehicles up to our forward tps through the lanes cleared up to the assault bridges and beyond. Even Weasels got stuck. A carrying party was organised from Div tps of some 800 men to get supplies and ammunition up, but these eventually were not necessary as during the night HONGEN was captured from the rear. HEINSBERG was attacked during the day by fighter intruders and fires were started.

42. 19 Jan. During the night 8 Armd Bde moving along the ECHT road established forward elements of armour and tps in KONINGS-BOSCH. With the capture of HONGEN the engineers were able to lay an assault bridge over the SAEFFLER BEEK in HONGEN and by midday the road from SITTARD to HONGEN was open. The enemy had mined the road, including using some of our unexploded 3" mortar bombs as mines, as well as cutting many trees down across the road. These were effectively bulldozed away. The road from HEILDER to HAVERT was also opened thus enabling vehicles to get up to the forward tps in that area. During the day operations to clear the villages to the EAST of HONGEN were continued by 156 Inf Bde (7 CAMERONIANS), SAEFFLEEN was cleared by midday and BREBEREN just before dark. These operations were supported by Flails and Crocodiles. The whole of the enemy front defence line, except for certain small pockets, was cleared when ISENBRUCH surrendered during the morning. Several of the PW captured at this village had apparently moved there from HAVERT to avoid being at the receiving end of another Rocket bty salvo, which they expressed as devastating. The moral and physical effect of this bty was further confirmed by PW captured at BREBEREN soon after a salvo had been fired in that area. They were just able to talk but were so dazed that several walked into walls without seeing where they were going. Observers from our own lines commented on the way these salvos seemed to obliterate the areas on which they fell, and it is undoubtedly a most effective weapon.

At 1930 hrs Operation Instruction No.5 was issued outlining the plan for phase EAGLE to be carried out at the earliest possible time by 8 Armd Bde with under command 155 Inf Bde. This, however, had to be considerably modified because the main axis of advance of 8 Armd Bde from ECHT to KONINGSBOSCH was blocked by one of our own derelict tanks which could not be quickly moved as it was still under fire from the enemy. The net result was that the only other axis of advance, namely the main 52 (L) Inf Div route - SITTARD - HONGEN - HEILDER, would have to be used. This, however, conflicted with the move of 52 (L) Inf Div arty who were scheduled to move during the night into the SAEFFELN - HEILDER - STEIN - HAVERT area. As this arty had in any case to move up to this area to support the EAGLE phase whatever plan was used, the 8 Armd Bde plan had to be scrapped. 157 Inf Bde were therefore detailed to capture BOCKET the following morning supported by the Div arty, tanks, Crocodiles and Flails. On the night 19/20 Jan, the villages of BUSCHERHEIDE 7770 and BROICHHOVEN 7671 were cleared and the whole of the enemy front line was now firmly in our hands. KONINGSBOSCH, which still harboured a few enemy, was also cleared and the area at AAN DE SCHOOL 7575 was secured. The Div arty completed its concentration during the night in the SAEFFELN - HEILDER - HAVERT area.

43. 20 Jan. The attack on BOCKET was carried out by 6 HLI. The start was somewhat delayed owing to traffic jams due to unavoidable blocks on the main road caused by tanks and other vehicles skidding on the very treacherous road surface. Resistance was light and the excellent armd support made the entry into the village comparatively easy although mortar fire from the neighbouring village of HONTEM caused some casualties while the enemy were still being winkled out of cellars and other places. The capture of this village undoubtedly was a nasty blow for the enemy as it dominated his switch line running along the line of the villages LAFFELD - SELSTEN - HONTEM - FRILINGHOVEN - WALDFEUCHT - ECHTERBOSCH. One 88 mm was captured and 83 PW, making a grand total of 16 officers 584 other ranks through the Div cage since the operation started on 18 Jan.

With the capture of BOCKET it was obviously necessary to push home our advantage by securing WALDFEUCHT while the enemy was still on the wrong foot. 155 Inf Bde was therefore ordered to secure both WALDFEUCHT and ECHTERBOSCH by 210600 hours. If it was snowing and hindered the use of artificial moonlight, the attack could be postponed till 211300 hours. In addition, 156 Inf Bde were given the task of securing SELSTEN by 211500 hours and 157 Inf Bde HONTEM and the spur EAST of FRILINGHOVEN. 52 Recce Regt was given a role of securing the Div LEFT flank. Each Bde was given a proportion of support arms including Flails and Crocodiles.

Earlier in the day 4 SOM LI from 43 Inf Div relieved 7 CAMERONIANS in BREBEREN. RE opened the main axis road up to the cross roads SOUTH of BOCKET and also established a water point at HEILDER. Typhoons attacked LAFFELD with good results. The night attacks on WALDFEUCHT and ECHTERBOSCH were successful, little opposition being encountered. The former was captured at 0300 hours and the latter by 0700 hours.

44. 21 Jan. At about 0630 hours the enemy launched, with local reserve, an ineffective attack against WALDFEUCHT from the FRILINGHOVEN area. This was followed by a much stronger attack of approximate strength of a bn together with about 15 SP guns and 6 Tiger tanks launched from the NORTH and directed on both WALDFEUCHT and ECHTERBOSCH. At the former village the 5 KOSB were defending with three coys and the remaining coy was at the latter village. The enemy gained a lodgement in the Eastern part of WALDFEUCHT and one coy of the bn got cut off from the remainder of the bn. This was chiefly due to the close support given by one Tiger tank which had also

.../effected an

effected an entry to the village. This tank had an exciting time remaining in the village for about 3 hours, being harried RIGHT and LEFT by our inf. It could not escape through two entrances as they were solid old brick entrances too narrow for a Tiger to pass through. Another entrance had been blocked by the KOSB. Several shots with PsiAT and sticky grenades appeared to have no effect. The Tiger was assisted by local civilians who managed to indicate the houses from which our tps were attempting to knock the tank out. The Tiger merely turned its 88 mm gun on to the edifice and one shot generally smashed the house concerned. It eventually managed to escape by one of the only entrances remaining under cover of the German inf in the village.

In the meantime, two further Tigers arrived on the Eastern side of the village and almost immediately knocked out two of our own Shermans belonging to 13/18 H, plus some other vehicles. Almost at the same time, the anti-tank pl commander of the bn arrived together with two of his six pounder guns on the outskirts of the village. This pl commander knocked both these Tigers out. The position was gradually restored in WALDFEUCHT during the rest of the day - and a relief force, consisting of 4 KOSB, arrived by dark. At ECHTERBOSCH the enemy attack was defeated without great difficulty and no real effort was made later to get into this place though an armed battle was fought round it for some time. During this battle, Air OPs were of great value and the medium arty was successfully directed on several of the enemy SP guns and tanks.

Altogether, the WALDFEUCHT action was a considerable success for our inf, armour and the SP guns. A German Operation Order belonging to 341 Army Assault Bde was captured later in the operation. This revealed that the counter attack force was intended originally for BOCKET. The attack was to start at 0630 hours on 21 Jan with the SL based on WALDFEUCHT. This probably accounts for the somewhat confused attack which was put in on WALDFEUCHT itself and exemplifies para 14 (b) of Field Marshal MONTGOMERY's "Inf Div in Battle" which stipulates as one of the basic points of a setpiece attack, that the start line must be secure.

On the rest of the 156 Inf Bde front (7 CAMERONIANS) with Crocodiles in support had little difficulty in capturing SELSTEN before dark, while 157 Inf Bde (1 GLAS H) with SRY, Flails and Crocodiles in support, secured the villages of HONTEM and FRILINGHOVEN. The enemy switch line, except for the villages of BRAUNSRATH and LAFFELD, was thus practically in our hands. During the day's operations, 3 officers and 138 other ranks PW were captured. 52 Recce Regt took over the HAVERT - SCHALBRUCH area from 5 HLI who then concentrated in the SAEFFELN area. 6 HLI relieved 7 CAMERONIANS during the night, the latter concentrating in BOCKET. 8 Armd Bde, less SRY, were concentrated between WALDFEUCHT and KONINGSBOSCH.

Orders were issued for 157 Inf Bde to capture LAFFELD and 156 Inf Bde to capture BRAUNSRATH the following afternoon. Patrols however, had reported the latter village being clear of the enemy and as a result it was occupied by 6 CAMERONIANS during the night with no opposition. The enemy made a small counter attack on SELSTEN during the night. It was easily repelled.

45. 22 Jan. 5 HLI with SRY, one tp of Flails and one tp of Crocodiles, captured LAFFELD before dark with little opposition and with the satisfactory haul of 80 PW. LOCKEN, the high ground immediately to the EAST, and SCHONDORF were all cleared during the first few hours of darkness by 156 Inf Bde supported by sub-units from 157 Inf Bde. An encircling movement from the EAST culminated in the capture of OBSPRINGEN in the early hours of 23 Jan. During these night operations,

.../as on all



as on all other night operations to date, artificial moonlight was used to great effect and was of much assistance to our tps. 155 Inf Bde, (4 KOSB), also secured ERDBRUGGERHOP 7875 and BRUGGELCHEN 7876. 52 Recce Regt moved up on the LEFT flank of 155 Inf Bde and guarded the wooded area to the NW and WEST of ECHTERBOSCH.

The only outstanding village before the HEINSBERG line was APHOVEN and orders were issued to 157 Inf Bde to capture it, together with the ridge just to the EAST of the village, by 1500 hours 23 Jan.

During the late afternoon and after dark, the Div arty moved up to the WEST of the SELSTEN - HONTEM area.

46. 23 Jan. 6 HLI with in support SRY (less one sqn), Flails, Crocodiles and full Corps arty, had little difficulty in capturing the APHOVEN area. The garrison to the place was small and it yielded only 9 PW. After its capture, the enemy directed considerable mortar fire on the Northern end of the village but our casualties were only slight.

At 0930 hrs the Div Commander gave out his orders for the capture of HEINSBERG. The operation was to be carried out by 155 Inf Bde during the night 23/24 Jan. In outline the plan was an encircling one to be carried out by two bns (7/9 RS and 4 KOSB), from the APHOVEN area.

This force was to provide two flanking columns to surround the town, including the LEFT flank, followed by a force of beaters accompanied by two tps of Crocodiles through the town winking out the enemy from their hiding places. The arty plan was to have a standing barrage on the community trench, followed by a box barrage to enclose the town with stonks as well as the middle of the town. Searchlights were to illuminate the objective, and Bofors were to give directional fire. Finally, 17 pounders were to move up early to cover possible tank approaches. The town had already suffered from heavy and medium bomber attacks, and harassing fire from medium and heavy arty - both British and US, (from the SOUTH), - had been applied at various times during the preceding week.

47. 24 Jan. The capture of HEINSBERG went according to plan but the final mopping up carried well into the morning. Opposition to our entry was light; later an ineffective attempt by two bodies, each of approximately 30 inf, was made to counter attack the town from the EAST. These were engaged by arty and the counter attack was broken up. The enemy's next effort was from area LIECK 8475 and was made by about 50 inf with a Tiger tank and two SP guns. This group was caught by our guns as it was forming up and was rapidly dispersed but not before the Tiger had been knocked out by an SP anti-tank gun, making the third for the whole operation. Moderate shelling and a little mortaring had been coming into HEINSBERG all through the morning; at about 1300 hours very heavy mortaring, interspersed with some shell fire, started and continued until about 1630 hours. It was estimated by forward tps that at least 12 mortars were involved and these were sited in the area immediately WEST of LIECK. The area was stonked at 1630 hrs and the mortaring stopped. Later at intervals the area was stonked by our arty with air bursts which seemed to close down completely the enemy mortar activity. In addition, the KLOSTERHOF area 8474, which probably had contained the mortar OPs, was captured. As a result the night in HEINSBERG passed off without incident. 180 PW were captured in the town.

In the evening sounds of retreating tractor vehicles were heard in the KIRCHOVEN area moving NE and this was probably the enemy withdrawing towards and over R ROER.

HAAREN which had been reported the previous night as clear of the enemy, was occupied during the morning by 7 CAMERONIANS.

.../With HEINSBERG

With HEINSBERG safely in our hands, orders were issued at 1910 hours for 157 Inf Bde to capture LIECK and KIRCHOVEN starting at 250600 hours, and 156 Inf Bde to link up with 157 Inf Bde NW of KIRCHOVEN after first securing DRIESCH - HAAS - VINN. 52 Recce Regt were to clear the woods NORTH of HAAREN and to maintain contact with 7 Armd Div.

48. 25 Jan. 5 HLI with Crocodiles and Flails carried out 157 Inf Bde task and LIECK and KIRCHOVEN were both occupied without opposition. Similarly, with no opposition and when the above task was nearing completion, 4/5 RSF, (for 156 Inf Bde), occupied DRIESCH, HAAS and VINN. Altogether 17 PW were collected being mostly stragglers and deserters. Patrols were pushed forward towards the villages on the WEST bank of the R ROER. Some were found unoccupied, in others there was an exchange of shots. It was obvious that what remaining elements the enemy had WEST of the R ROER had been withdrawn to the EAST bank.

52 Recce Regt cleared the woods NORTH of HAAREN and were in contact with elements of 7 Armd Div.

#### CONCLUSION

49. (a) With the occupation of the HEINSBERG - DRIESCH - HAAREN line the operation as far as 52 (L) Inf Div were concerned really concluded. In the course of the week's fighting the Div captured 40 small towns and villages plus HEINSBERG. Certain regrouping had to take place and Bdes resumed their normal organisation. Evacuation of German civilians - of whom there were about 700 in the area - had already started and was continuing. The main road to HEINSBERG from SITTARD was opened by the engineers as a Class 40 route.

#### (b) PW

23 officers and 1112 other ranks PW were captured and in addition 85 PW were evacuated wounded through medical channels.

#### (c) Casualties

Div casualties were :-

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>	<u>Total</u>	
Killed	4	84	88	} 101
Died of wounds	1	12	13	
Wounded	32	619	651	651
				<hr/>
				752
				<hr/>

During the ten day period 258 sick were evacuated through medical channels. Considering the adverse weather conditions and the extreme cold particularly at night, 25 medical cases per day speaks for the general hardihood and excellent men management in the Div. There was no case of any single wounded man being affected by exposure during the operation. Moreover, practically all the wounded arrived in good condition at ADSs which is attributable to the intense cold stopping bleeding. The only other casualties were 71 evacuated for various forms of accidents.

PART IV

43 INF DIV

See Map and Diagram 3

GENERAL

50. Prior to Operation 'BLACKCOCK', 43 Inf Div had spent approximately two months in or near to the area of operations. The habits of the enemy had been carefully studied and patrols and air reconnaissance furnished much useful and important information. Just before the operation commenced, the ground over which the Div was to fight was reproduced on a model and the plan of operations was explained to all concerned.

ADDITIONAL TPS 43 INF DIV

51.           Under Command   6 Gds Tk Bde (Churchill tks)  
   (340 A Tk Bty)  
   'C' Sqn 141 RAC (Crocodiles)  
   'B' Sqn W DGNS (Flails)  
   16 Assault Sqn RE, less one tp (AVRE)  
   Sqn 1 Cdn APC Regt (from D + 3) (Kangaroos)  
   6 Field Regt (from D + 3)  
   Tp 344 SL Bty  
   'C' Flt 653 Air OP Sqn  
   Det 100 Radar Unit  
   Two tentacles  
   263 Field Coy RE (from a.m. D + 4)
- In support       12 Corps Arty Gp (incl 3 and 9 AGsRA  
   RA 52(L) Inf Div,  
   US Arty Gps)  
   Det 1141 US Combat Engr Gp.

PLAN

52.           (For details of 43 Inf Div Operation Instruction see Appendix 5).
- (a) The plan consisted in the direction of Bde Gps in succession to attack, capture and re-organise a series of limited objectives which were in every case a line of villages and centres of communication.
- (b) As a preliminary, 129 Inf Bde was to advance and secure the vicinity of the crossing of the obstacle belt SOUTH of BREBEREN 7771. The sequence of operations was then as follows :-
- |       |             |   |        |
|-------|-------------|---|--------|
| (i)   | 130 Inf Bde | - | HART   |
| (ii)  | 129 Inf Bde | - | JUG I  |
| (iii) | 130 Inf Bde | - | JUG II |
| (iv)  | 214 Inf Bde | - | KETTLE |

53. There were certain factors which affected and limited the plan, slowed it up somewhat and made necessary the rigid adherence to a time table of phases. These were :-

- (a) The availability of 12 Corps Arty Group which was used also to support 7 Armd Div and 52(L) Inf Div.

...(b) The maintenance

- (b) The maintenance of the attack as near as possible in line with 52(L) Inf Div on the LEFT so that neither div got too far in front of the other so making a salient inviting easy counter attack.
- (c) The availability of one sqn only of 1 Cdn APC Regt. This sqn was allotted to each Bde Group in turn; the maintenance of vehicles and rest of crews were important considerations.
- (d) The movement of arty as each objective in turn was secured.
- (e) The early opening and constant policing of roads to ensure a steady flow of traffic for all purposes.

#### ADMINISTRATION

54. The Div Administrative plan is of interest for the following reasons :-

- (a) It was intended to use Compo and normal rations only, though a reserve of 24-hour Ration Packs was held for use in an emergency.
- (b) WEASELS were allotted to bdes and used for the evacuation of casualties.
- (c) Recovery in the early stages was confined to road clearance only. It was essential this order be strictly obeyed so that the limited roads could be kept open and clear. Whenever large recovery vehicles disobeyed this order, large congestions of vehicles on roads were the result.

#### SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS

##### PRE-PHASE HART ACTION : 20 Jan 45

55. The advance to secure the vicinity of the crossing of the obstacle belt SOUTH of BREBEREN 7774 by one bn group of 129 Inf Bde commenced at 0815 hours. No opposition was encountered and the task force entered BREBEREN, made contact with elements of 52(L) Inf Div, and took over the village. The Class 40 Bridge in the village was found to be intact.

During the advance towards BREBEREN, though in view from LANGBROICH 7970, 129 Inf Bde received no enemy fire from that direction. As a result, the bde occupied LANGBROICH without opposition.

A reconnaissance in force towards SCHIERWALDENRATH 8170 by 129 Inf Bde found the enemy in occupation.

##### PHASE HART : 21 Jan 45

56. As a result of the occupation of LANGBROICH by 129 Inf Bde on 20 Jan, the first part of PHASE HART was completed for 130 Inf Bde who took over LANGBROICH by 1200 hrs this day.

During the night 20/21 Jan, snow fell, and froze, making operations difficult, especially the movement of MT which slid and skidded about the roads.

130 Inf Bde attacked SCHIERWALDENRATH at 0845 hours. The village was found to be empty, the enemy having withdrawn during the night. 13 PW taken.

##### PHASE HART : 22 Jan 45

57. After a smokescreen had been put down SOUTH of LAFFEID 8272 and SCHEIFENDAHL 8371 to cover the attack from view to the NORTH,

.../130 Inf Bde

130 Inf Bde commenced the attack on PUTT 8270 at 0700 hours. The attack was slowed down by bad weather conditions which made difficult going for vehicles and by extensive minefields, and booby traps which were difficult to locate under the frozen snow. By 0900 hours PUTT was captured: little opposition was encountered though 1 SP gun was knocked out and 20 PW taken.

From PUTT, 129 Inf Bde commenced the attack on WALDENRATH 8369. Heavy arty and mortar concentrations preceded the attack with good results, for the inf encountered little opposition, capturing WALDENRATH and 168 PW by 1200 hours.

The total number of PW taken from PUTT and WALDENRATH by 7 HAMPs was 203.

During the day Typhoons attacked SCHLEIDEN 8572 and UETTERATH 8770. The attack on SCHLEIDEN was very successful; a tremendous explosion occurred which caused the village to disintegrate. At UETTERATH, the RAF met very strong light AA fire and lost three aircraft.

PHASE JUG I : 23 Jan 45

58. 129 Inf Bde commenced the attack on STRAETEN 8469 at 0856 hours. The enemy put up little fight and by 1050 hours STRAETEN was captured with over 200 PW. Enemy SP guns were active and knocked out three Churchill tanks.

At 1300 hours, 129 Inf Bde commenced the attack on SCHEIFENDAHL 8371. A smokescreen was put down to the NORTH to cover the advance of the inf in Kangaroos. Many of the latter could not move on the icy ground and the inf got out and advanced on foot. Little enemy opposition was encountered though many mines and booby traps were found. SCHEIFENDAHL was captured at 1430 hours and 200 PW taken.

From SCHEIFENDAHL, 129 Inf Bde attacked ERPEN 8471. Again little opposition was encountered though many PW were taken. A counter attack by inf on ERPEN was repulsed during the afternoon.

The many PW taken during the day included an Inf Regt Commander and his staff. The PW were predominately inf and they gave themselves up without much fight. They gave the impression of being stunned by the terrific arty mortar and MMG concentrations put down on them. They stated that they were overwhelmed by our men and material and considered they had done their bit for the Fatherland; some still considered the end would turn out in their favour.

PHASE JUG I : 24 Jan 45

59. For the completion of PHASE JUG I, this day, 129 Inf Bde had additional tps under command :-

One sqn 1 Cdn AFC (Kangaroos)  
One tp W DGNS (Flails)

The attack on SCHLEIDEN 8572 commenced at 1500 hours and the attack on UETTERATH 8770 at 1600 hours. The enemy put up a short, stiff fight at SCHLEIDEN but was rapidly overcome and before dark both SCHLEIDEN and UETTERATH were captured and occupied, the latter without much opposition. BERG 8870, BAUMEN 8769 and BLAUESTEIN 8669 were also occupied by 129 Inf Bde without opposition.

PHASE JUG II and KETTLE : 25 Jan 45

60. It was obvious from the actions in PHASE JUG I that the enemy were beginning to withdraw. In consequence, PHASE JUG II (130 Inf Bde) and KETTLE (214 Inf Bde) which were to have been carried out in succession, were carried out concurrently.

214 Inf Bde advanced and occupied KOGENBROICH 8967, HOVEN 8868, KRAUDORF 8968 and NIRM 9068. 130 Inf Bde captured the area SCHAFHAUSEN 8673 - GREBBEN 8873 - DREMME 8872 - FORSELEN 9072, and by 1800 hours; carrier patrols of 7 HAMPs reported HORST 9071 and RANDERATH 9069 clear.

.../These latter

These latter villages were subsequently taken over by 214 Inf Bde.

At the same time, 102 US Inf Div attacked against light resistance on the RIGHT of 214 Inf Bde. 405 RCT captured HONSDORF 9168 and HIMMERICH 9170, and contacted 214 Inf Bde at RANDEATH 9169.

PHASES JUG II and KETTLE : 26 Jan 45

61. Moving up to the R ROER, 130 Inf Bde patrols encountered an enemy strong point at 892745.

214 Inf Bde having completed its part in the attack began to move to SCHIMMERT 6558.

This ended Operation 'BLACKCOCK' for 43 Inf Div.

P A R T     V

COMMENTS AND POINTS OF INTEREST

GENERAL

62. Enemy

The enemy fought well during the earlier phases of this operation and particularly so when the fresh reserves from Regt HUBNER, brought SOUTH from the ROERMOND area, arrived on the scene. He has brought delaying actions by small bodies of inf backed by SP guns to a fine art. During "BLACKCOCK", owing to the great difficulty experienced by our armour of manoeuvring off the roads or tracks, everything was in his favour and he made full use of it. The wooded areas and the often surprisingly broken ground gave him the opportunities required. Working over country which he knew thoroughly, and behind his own mines, he used his SP guns boldly and to full advantage.

63. Weather

The whole operation took place in severe winter conditions. This imposed considerable hardship on both men and machines. The hard frost did not entirely remain throughout and there were falls of snow, slight thaws and occasional fog to complicate operations. The roads generally remained icebound and the heavy tracked vehicles, particularly Kangaroos, found movement difficult. The road approaches to newly constructed bridges were always a problem and several bridges became damaged or blocked for short periods as a result of skidding vehicles. Off the roads movement was always a gamble. There was a thin frozen surface crust which collapsed, on account of the occasional short thaws, under the weight of heavy vehicles and bogging was frequent.

Close support from the RAF could not be counted upon although on good flying days many targets were successfully engaged.

It was anticipated that there might be a large percentage of exposure casualties amongst the troops. This fear, however, proved groundless and their general health remained good throughout.

64. Arty

The initial planning proved sound and effective and the general regrouping plan for each phase worked well.

The question of over-worked FOOs requires consideration. During this operation, lasting eleven days, they were on almost constant duty the whole time. Replacement or relief is almost impossible to arrange, and although the individuals concerned worked throughout with praiseworthy enthusiasm it is questionable whether they could have continued very much longer without definite deterioration in the standard of their work.

65. Searchlights

These generally did good work and, except when their effect was nullified by fog, were a valuable assistance to bridge construction, maintenance and for fighting during the hours of darkness. It is essential that all lights have their own communications and not have to rely on the nearest gunner bty. In one instance a Searchlight tp was placed close to a bty for communication purposes and casualties were received by the light personnel due to enemy counter bty fire although

.../they themselves

they themselves had not used their light. The reverse might well occur, but in any event it is essential that lights should be instantly controllable on demand and any time lag due to lack of communications is to be deprecated.

66. Air

- (a) Support was much hampered by weather conditions but on clear days excellent results were obtained. Instances are as follows :-

22 Jan

168 sorties flown by Typhoons at eight targets with 1000 lb and 500 lb bombs; also armed recces, and one target engaged by medium bombers on this day.

23 Jan

80 sorties flown by Typhoons at nine targets including the HQ of 176 Div; also 62 sorties by medium bombers on two targets. On this day RAF expressed gratitude to our Arty who laid "Apple-Pie" on one target.

- (b) It is to be remembered that targets within the Bombline can be sometimes engaged provided precise arrangements can be made to identify the target by the use of coloured smoke, etc.
- (c) There were instances of unsuitable targets being demanded, e.g. "one tank in wood .....,."

On the other hand consideration of priorities, number of sorties already flown, time of day, etc, may prohibit the acceptance of what is apparently a most desirable target.

- (d) In view of the enemy practice of evicting civilians from the cellars in non-German towns and villages, the possibility of killing numbers of civilians must be weighed against the military importance of the target.

As a result of the air attacks on the non-German village of MONTFORT, enemy mortar fire was silenced and this road centre was completely blocked. This had been vitally important to the enemy as it enabled him to switch his SP guns to threatened points such as ST JOOST and LINNE.

It is reliably reported, however, that civilian casualties were high.

67. Specialised Armd Equipment

- (a) Flails

When used under snow conditions Flails cannot be considered 100% efficient. Inevitably casualties to following vehicles will occur and the fact must be accepted. When the ground is ice-bound, or otherwise very hard, considerable damage to bob weights is bound to take place. In spite of these two factors the Flails proved invaluable during the operations and were widely used. It is not perhaps fully realised by the Inf how much the heavy fire power of the Flail can assist them into their objective after the business of Flailing is completed. This aspect requires careful preparations and

.../liaison before



liaison before the operation starts.

Such use of Flail tanks will prove invaluable on occasions. Care must be taken, however, not to keep such tanks overlong on tasks of this nature, and any attempt to employ this specialised equipment in a purely inf-cum-tank role is to be discouraged.

- (b) It was found during this operation that when Flails operate over frozen ground the weight of the tank track will so damage 'S' mines and Schu mines as to neutralize them. If the inf walk in the tank tracks, which are easy to follow over frosty ground or ground lightly covered with snow, they will get through without casualties.

(c) Crocodiles

During this operation Crocodiles were in general, used as they should be and not in small packets. There was still a tendency for insufficient tying up between them and Inf and supporting tanks. It may well take three or more hours to arrange this satisfactorily but in the end it will be found time well spent. It is essential that a carefully prepared system of signals is arranged so that the Inf can let the Crocodiles know when to move on to flame the next house, group of houses, pill box, or other point of resistance. It is also essential to have a close tie up between the Crocodile which is very vulnerable, and the supporting tanks upon which it relies for its protection. Inf must learn to follow up the jet of flame immediately. There are still many who are frightened to walk or run through flame on the ground.

(d) AVsRE

Little comment is necessary. They proved invaluable in the early stages of operations and generally proved most successful.

(e) Kangaroos

Proved most useful but it is essential to guard against over working both crews and machines. To put tps into Kangaroos when it is safe to use TCVs or for the men to march is an incorrect use of the vehicle. To hold Kangaroos forward after the completion of the task, with the idea that another task may materialize, is uneconomical.

In this operation, the command of columns which included Kangaroos, rested with either the Inf or Tank Commander, and, thanks to careful preliminary planning, this arrangement worked well.

68. Weasels

The Divs held these concentrated in a pool to be used as and when required and the vehicles were not issued out to lower formations indiscriminately. They proved a valuable source of transport reserve, and, in particular, excellent for the evacuation of casualties. Drivers were provided by Inf bns and there is no doubt that this ad hoc arrangement discounts the full capabilities of these vehicles. In any case, drivers require some days' special training.

69. Traffic Control

All Divs appreciated the traffic problems likely to

.../predominate under

predominate under the prevailing weather conditions, and all set up special ad hoc organisations to meet these difficulties. These various arrangements worked extremely well.

If the man power situation allowed, it would obviously be very desirable to increase the establishment of Provost so that a greater allocation to Bdes could be made. In the present circumstances, it is considered, however, that such an increase cannot be justified.

#### 70. Administration

The operation offered no particular administration difficulties. One point of interest is worth noting with regard to 8 Armd Bde's plan for task BEAR. It was appreciated that little was, or could be, known of the routes to be used for the Eastward wheel away from the main SITTARD - SCHILBERG road. In order to cater for any unforeseen blockage on these routes which might have the effect of isolating supply echelons, each of both the main striking force columns had two identical A1 Supply echelons organised. Should one become involved and not therefore reach its forward tps, then the second could be despatched on an alternative open route.

#### TACTICS

71. (a) Operation BLACKCOCK was a large scale methodical mopping up operation. It was not planned to make any deep thrust into the enemy defences or to capture large numbers of PW. It proceeded from stage to stage almost entirely as planned and was successfully completed with minimum casualties.
- (b) The operation proved clearly that an Armd Div can operate successfully under conditions of climate and terrain such as those experienced in BLACKCOCK. It does, however, mean that Bdes must regroup very quickly and that both Bde HQs must be organised and trained to command both armour and inf, the exact proportions varying with each phase of operations. It is also necessary for all armour and inf units of an armd div to be trained to work with each other. Only in this way can the momentum of the battle be kept up successfully.
- (c) This operation showed clearly that the Germans intend to fight delaying actions in all small towns and villages which are suitable. An armd div needs to pay as much attention to this type of fighting as does an inf div. Such centres of resistance can sometimes be by-passed, but they will eventually have to be cleared. To clear them quickly and economically requires a carefully worked out battle drill. There must be the closest co-operation and an adequate system of communication between the inf, tanks and Crocodiles employed on such a task.

#### MISCELLANEOUS

72. 43 Inf Div reported that the 38 wireless set, as an Inf and tank co-operation link, was not entirely satisfactory.

EXTRACTS FROM 12 CORPS OP INSTR NO 26

11 Jan 45

INFM2. Own Tps:

(a) The following tps are likely to be available for this op:-

7 Armd Div  
 43 Div  
 52 (L) Div  
 6 Gds Tk Bde  
 8 Armd Bde  
 Supporting Arty (incl 3 and 9 AGsRA)  
 Supporting units from 79 Armd Div

(b) 8 Corps are co-operating by deploying guns in area MAESEYOK 6379 to sp attacks of 7 Armd Div and are op against STEVENSWERD Island 6783.

(c) XIII US Corps are co-operating by providing arty sp on the RIGHT of the Corps front and by capturing the spur NE of RANDERATH 9069. This latter op is being carried out after Phase JUG.

INTENTION

3. 12 Corps will clear the enemy out of the area bounded by the Rivers ROER 8184, WURM 8562, our present fwd localities and R MAAS 6167.

TASKS OF FMNS

4. (a) PHASE ANGEL: 7 Armd Div will seize area ECHT 6980 - SCHILBERG 7079 and est a Cl 40 route thence from SITTARD 6868.
- (b) PHASE BEAR: 7 Armd Div will seize area WALDFEUCHT 7775 - BOCKET 7874 - KONINGSBOSCH 7574.
- (c) PHASE CROWN: 52 (L) Div will seize area BREBEREN 7771 - SAEFFELN 7571 - HONGEN 7370 and area SCHALBRUCH 7173 - HAVERI 7172 - ISENBRUCH 6972.
- (d) PHASE DOLPHIN: 7 Armd Div will seize area MONTFORT 7482 - LINNE 7485.
- (e) PHASE EAGLE: 52 (L) Div will seize area HAAREN 7977 - BRAUNSRATH 8174.
- (f) PHASE FLEECE: 52 (L) Div will seize area KARKEN 8379 - KEMPEN 8578 - HUNNSBERG 8575 - KIRCHHOVEN 8376.
- (g) PHASE GLOBE: 7 Armd Div will seize area POSTERHOLT 8181 - ST ODILLENBERG 7884.
- (h) PHASE HART: 43 Div will seize area HARZELT 7970 - LANGBROICH 7970 - SCHIERWALDENRATH 8170 - PUTT 8270 - WALDENRATH 8369 - STRAETEN 8469.
- (j) PHASE JUG: 43 Div will seize area SCHLAFHAUSEN 8674 - DREMMEN 8872 - UETTERATH 8770 - ERPEN 8471.
- (k) PHASE KETTLE: 43 Div will co-operate with XIII US Corps in their capture of the RANDERATH spur. Details will be arranged direct with 102 US Inf Div.

.../BDYS

BDYS

5. See Appx 'A' attached.

GROUPING

6. See Appx 'B' attached.

TIMINGS

7. (a) Phase ANGEL will start at last light on D Day and should be completed by 1600 hrs on D + 1.  
On completion 7 Armd Div will NOT adv with main bodies to area MONTFORT - LINNE, without orders from 12 Corps.
- (b) Phase BEAR will start immediately Phase ANGEL is completed and will continue throughout the hrs of light and darkness until its objectives are secured. Mov Light will be used at night.
- (c) Phase CROWN will be scheduled to start at first light on D + 2. The best conditions for this attack are that tps of 7 Armd Div should be on or approaching their final objectives in Phase BEAR. Arrangements will be made by 52 (L) Div, so that it can be postponed for a few hrs if there has been some delay in Phase BEAR.  
If, however, there seems little chance of full success in Phases ANGEL and BEAR Phase CROWN will take place at a time to be decided in accordance with the development of the situation.
- (d) Timings after the completion of Phase CROWN depend on the development of the situation, but time must be allowed for guns to move fwd before Phase EAGLE can start. The estimated earliest time for this is on the morning of D + 3.
- (e) Phase DOLPHIN may quite possibly take place on the same day.
- (f) The most probable subsequent course of events will be:-
- (i) Phase HART immediately after Phase EAGLE.
  - (ii) Phases FLEECE and GLOBE probably concurrently after Phase HART.
  - (iii) Phase JUG immediately after Phase FLEECE.

PRELIMINARY MEASURES BEFORE D DAY

8. Reliefs

- (a) 43 Div will relieve 52 (L) Div in the line as ordered separately. The six fwd bns will be relieved on night 11/12 Jan and the three res bns on 12 Jan.  
Comd will pass at 121000A.
- (b) 52 (L) Div will relieve Eastern Sector of 7 Armd Div on 12 Jan as ordered separately. Comd will pass when relief is complete.

9. Capture of BAKENHOVEN 6676

7 Armd Div will seize BAKENHOVEN as a preliminary op. This will take place on night D minus 3/D minus 2.

...10./Specialised

10. Specialised Trg for Aslt Crossings by night

7 Armd Div will carry this out between 12 Jan and D Day.

11. Re-deployment of Guns

Any re-deployment of guns which is not involved in inter-fmn reliefs will be delayed as long as possible so as not to interfere with these reliefs or prejudice surprise.

12. Release of RE Units

In order that all Corps Tps Fd Coys can be used to reinforce Div Engrs for the many RE tasks involved, 280 Fd Coy RE will hand over responsibility for the maint of BORGHAREN Br to Army RE on morning of D minus 2.

13. Conferences

The Comd will hold the following conferences:-

- (a) With GOC 7 Armd Div at HQ that fmn at 121500A.
- (b) With GOC 52 (L) Div at HQ that fmn at 131500A.
- (c) With GOC 43 Div at HQ that fmn at 141000A.
- (d) Final Coord Conference at Main HQ 12 Corps at 141500A.

CCRA and GSO 1 12 Corps will attend (a), (b) and (c).  
CsRA, GSOs 1 and Comd 8 Armd Bde may attend (d) at discretion fmn Comds.

RA

14. (a) The various phases of the op will be supported by all guns in the Corps Arty which can be brought to bear under comd CCRA.
- (b) The weight of arty available for each phase is as follows:-
- (i)  
PHASE ANGEL: Five fd regts, three med regts, one bty 155 mm, three btys 7.2" how, one HAA regt and two btys HAA.
  - (ii)  
PHASE BEAR: Six fd regts, six med regts, one bty 155 mm, one bty 7.2" how and two btys HAA.
  - (iii)  
PHASE CROWN: Six fd regts, six med regts, two btys 7.2" how, four btys HAA and one mtn regt.
  - (iv)  
PHASE DOLPHIN: Six fd regts, four med regts, one hy regt and one HAA regt.
  - (v)  
PHASE EAGLE: Six fd regts, one mtn regt, four med regts, two btys 7.2" how and two btys HAA.
  - (vi)  
PHASE FLEECE: Eight fd regts, one mtn regt, six med regts, two btys 7.2" how and two btys HAA.

...(vii)/PHASE

(vii)

PHASE GLOBE: Six fd regts, six med regts, two btys 7.2" how, one HAA regt and two btys HAA.

(viii)

PHASE HART: Six fd regts, six med regts, two btys 7.2" how and two btys HAA.

(ix)

PHASE JUG: Six fd regts, five med regts, two btys 7.2" how and two btys HAA.

In addition, US arty are carrying out CB on front 43 Div and harassing brs over R ROER and approaches from the EAST.

- (c) Each div has its own div arty, its CS med regt and one other med regt at priority call throughout the op for DF.
- (d) One bty mattress is available for the op and will remain under comd CCRA for sp of fmns.
- (e) 6 Fd Regt will now also be available for the op and is placed under comd 7 Armd Div until completion Phase DOLPHIN when it passes to under comd 43 Div.

15. A tk

The 17-pr towed A tk btys of 86 A tk Regt will remain initially in sp of 43 Div and 52 (L) Div to help in the def of the firm base.

AIR SP

16. Owing to weather conditions no reliability will be placed on the availability of air sp.

If conditions allow 83 Gp to operate, opportunity targets will be called for in the normal way while other tasks will be selected by the Corps Comd. Suggestions for these latter tasks may be forwarded by fm comds at any time.

MMGs AND MORTARS

17. Additional sp of MMGs and mortars given by fmns to each other will be arranged mutually.

RE

18. Responsibility for establishing and maintaining Corps Cl 40 routes fwd is as follows:-

(a) By 52 (L) Div

Excl TUDDERN (X-rds 714699) - HONGEN 7370 - SAEFFELN 7571 - BRAUNSRATH 8174.

(b) By 7 Armd Div

- (i) SITTARD - ROERMOND
- (ii) ECHT 6979 - BOCKET 7874.

(c) By C Tps RE

SITTARD - TUDDERN (incl X-rds 714699)

...(d)/By

(d) By 43 Div

STAHE 8066 - BIRGDEN 8168 - WALDENRATH 8369 - DREMME 8872.

19. For allocation of additional RE resources to fmns see Appx 'B' (GROUPING).

19A. TRAFFIC CONTROL

Traffic control on BERG Br 6169 and the approaches to it passes to 7 Armd Div at 0001 hrs 16 Jan reverting to 12 Corps at 0001 hrs 19 Jan.

DECEPTION

20. It is vital that the enemy should not discover our intentions. The cover plan, which will be widely disseminated, is that the wintry weather has forced us to put 43 Div into the line to reduce the sectors of other fmns and so make more frequent relief possible.

21. Briefing - especially infm re D Day and H Hrs - will be carried out as late as possible. This applies particularly to tps in rear areas, Corps tps and reinforcing units.

RA orders and task tables will not divulge D Day or H Hrs which will be communicated separately.

All ranks will again be warned of the danger of discussing these matters among themselves or with civs.

22. Should the enemy discover later that we are about to attack, the basis of all deception resources, which will be initiated by 12 Corps, will be to make the enemy believe that we intend to attack from the GEILENKIRCHEN area direct on HEINSBERG and DREMME.

23. D Day will be communicated separately.

INTERCOM

24. (a) Main HQ 12 Corps remains present location, moving later to SITTARD.

(b) Rear HQ 12 Corps remains present location.

(c) HQ 43 Div: BRUNSSUM 7662.

(d) HQ 52 (L) Div: NUTH 6959, moving later to SITTARD.

(e) HQ 7 Armd Div: LIMBRICHT 6669, thence via main rd SITTARD - ROERMOND.

26. Wireless Silence

Wef 121000, 43 Div will break wireless silence and then minimize as much as possible.

APPENDIX 'A'

BOUNDARIES

1. RIGHT between XIII US Corps and 12 Brit Corps

All excl 12 Brit Corps X-rds 576535 - ROTHEN 5955 - all incl 12 Brit Corps MEERSEN 6035 - GR HAESDAL 6456 - AALBEEK 6757 - NUTH 6959 - excl 12 Brit Corps NUINHOF 7059 - all incl 12 Brit Corps TERSCHUREN

.../7159

7159 - HOENSBROEK 7259 - BEERSDAL 7557 - all excl 12 Brit Corps HEERLEN  
 7656 - track junc 787579 - rd junc 792582 - X-rds 794582 - rd at 810590  
 - rd at 814592 - X-rds 819599 - X-rds 823605 - X-tracks 826610 - incl  
 12 Brit Corps SIEPENBUSCH 8361 - all excl 12 Brit Corps rd junc 842618  
 - rd at 852625 - rd to 855631 - X-rds 858639 - rd to X-rds 865646 - X-rds  
 874651 - thence line of R WURM to 917723 - thence due NORTH to X-rds  
 917752.

2. Between RIGHT 43 Div and LEFT 52 (L) Div

Excl 43 Div SUSTERSLEEL 7467 - all incl 43 Div X-tracks 757696 -  
 BREBEREN 7771 - NACHBARHEID 778719 - X-rds 806723 - all excl 43 Div  
 X-rds 821726 - rd junc 840731 - X-rds 868747 - rd junc 904766.

3. Between RIGHT 52 (L) Div and LEFT 7 Armd Div

All incl 7 Armd Div GELEEN 6765 - OPHOVEN 6867 - all excl 7 Armd  
 Div rd junc 692678 - rd junc 696686 - incl 7 Armd Div OVERHOVEN 6969 -  
 all excl 7 Armd Div MILLEN 6971 - ISENBRUCH 6973 - SCHALBRUCH 7173 -  
 rd to X-rds 736777 - rd to X-tracks 767788 - all incl 7 Armd Div  
 ANNENDAAL 8080 - X-rds 821808.

4. LEFT between 12 Brit Corps and 8 Brit Corps

All incl 8 Brit Corps MEEUWEN 4480 - NEERGLABEEK 5178 - OPOETEREN  
 5476 - bend in rd at 571780 - NEEROETEREN 5778 - MAESEYCK 6379.

5. 43 Div will grant 52 (L) Div running rights on the rd AMSTENRADE  
 7361 - SCHINVELD 7664 - GANGEIT 7767.

APPENDIX 'B'

GROUPING

(a) 7 Armd Div

8 Armd Bde less one regt and one coy 12 KRRC  
 One inf bde 52 (L) Div  
 147 Fd Regt  
 Two pls C Tps RE and two Churchill Br Layers  
 One aslt sqn RE less one tp and incl one aslt brs  
 One SP bty 86 A tk Regt  
 One sqn less one tp FLAILS (LOTHIAN & BORDER YEO)  
 One tcl  
 Regt KANGAROOS (ii) (1 Cdn Armd Personnel Carrier Regt)  
 6 Fd Regt until completion Phase DOLPHIN  
 One Sqn FLAILS (iii) (LOTHIAN & BORDER YEO)  
 One tp AVRE incl three aslt brs (42 Aslt Regt RE)  
 One sqn CROCODILES (141 RAC)  
 One fd coy C Tps RE  
 One tp 344 SL Bty  
 'A' Flt 653 Air OP Sqn  
 One det 100 Radar Bty  
 Two tcls

(i)

(b) 52 (L) Div

8 Armd Bde less one regt and one coy 12 KRRC  
 One inf bde 52 (L) Div  
 147 Fd Regt  
 Two pls C Tps RE  
 One aslt sqn RE less one tp and incl one aslt brs  
 One SP bty 86 A tk Regt  
 One sqn less one tp FLAILS  
 One tcl

(iv)

.../One



One armd regt and one coy 12 KRRC (ex 8 Armd Bde)  
One sqn and one tp FLAILS  
One sqn CROCODILES  
One tp AVRE incl two aslt brs  
'B' Flt 653 Air OP Sqn  
One tp 344 SL bty  
One det 100 Radar Bty  
Two tcls  
Mattress (six salvoes only)  
One Churchill bridge layer (ex 6 Gds Tk Bde)

(c) 43 Div

6 Gds Tk Bde  
6 Fd Regt after completion of Phase DOLPHIN  
One sqn CROCODILES  
One SP bty 86 A tk Regt  
'C' Flt 653 Air OP Sqn  
One tp 344 SL Bty  
One det 100 Radar Bty  
Two tcls  
One sqn FLAILS (B Sqn Westminster Dragoons)  
One aslt sqn RE less two tps

(d) Corps Res

Two centipedes  
'A' Flt 652 Air OP Sqn under CCRA  
One tp AVRE incl two aslt brs

NOTES :

- (i) Until completion Phase BEAR when these pass to comd 52 (L) Div.
- (ii) Passes to under comd 52 (L) Div on completion Phase BEAR. One sqn will later be allotted to 43 Div for Phase HART, 52 (L) Div retaining remaining sqn.
- (iii) One tp will not be employed without ref to 12 Corps.
- (iv) On completion Phase BEAR.
- (v) 43 Div will place one bn 6 Gds Tk Bde under comd XIII US Corps for Phase KETTLE.  
If possible 12 Corps will also make one sqn CROCODILES and one sqn FLAILS available for XIII US Corps for this op.
- (vi) All the above are definitely allotted by Army and all should arrive in time with possible exception of CROCODILES which may not be able to get here by D Day.



Extracts from RA 12 Corps Op Instr No. 38

Op 'BLACKCOCK'

11 Jan 45

8. Additional arty under comd and in sp

(a) Under comd

3 AGRA  
 13 Med Regt  
 59 Med Regt  
 59 Hy Regt less two btys 7.2" How  
 Two btys 165 HAA Regt  
 One additional flt Air OP  
 One RP Bty (Mattress)  
 6 Fd Regt

(b) In sp

8 Corps Arty Gp.

INTENTION

9. 12 Corps Arty will sp all phases of Op 'BLACKCOCK'.

METHOD

10. GROUPING

See Appx 'A'. 107 Med Gp ceases to exist and is replaced by 3 AGRA.

11. ALLOTMENT

See Appx 'B' for provisional allotment for planning.

MOVES

12. See Appx 'C' and Trace 'C'. (Diagram 2).

13. Preliminary Moves

Arty under comd fms and close sp med regts will move as required by fmn comds on D minus 1, night D minus 1/D, and D. Moves of arty of 3 and 9 AGRA will be co-ord by this HQ and will take place D minus 1, night D minus 1/D and D.

TASKS

14. Fms will produce fire plans and traces for distribution to all sp arty down to tps. RA 7 Armd Div will pass all fire plans for 8 Corps Arty Gp to this HQ for onward transmission to HQRA 11 Armd Div.

CB

15. Comd 9 AGRA will coord CB on the corps front. CBO will prepare CB programme to take place before phases ANGEL CROWN and HART. The CB programme prior to each of these phases will be completed by H minus 30 for the phase.

16. CBO will be prepared to order CB bombards throughout the op.

17. CBO will liaise with CBO 8 Corps and CBO XIII US Corps Arty.

CM

18. Under div arrangements. One det B Tp 100 Radar Bty under comd each RA 7 Armd Div, RA 43 Div, RA 52 (L) Div.

One bty 7.2" How 51 Hy Regt in sp 43 Div for CM.

.../SVY

SVY

19. Comd 7 Svy Regt will coord svy on the corps front.  
One det 7 Svy Regt in sp each RA 7 Armd Div, RA 43 Div, RA 52 (L) Div.

MET

20. Met 12 Corps will produce met infm every four hrs.

A TK

21. Allotment see Appx 'A'
22. Two 17 pr towed btys will remain in present locations and in sp 43 Div and 52 (L) Div for def of firm base and will be moved fwd on orders CCRA.
23. Comd 86 A tk Regt will coord A tk defs of final corps front on final objectives.

LAA

24. Div LAA Regts will be deployed as ordered by CSRA.
25. 112 LAA Regt Tasks :       SITTARD  
                              AGRA Gun areas.
26. Comd 112 LAA Regt will coord AA layout of corps area excl def of brs over R MEUSE.
27. Comd 71 LAA Regt Gp is responsible for def of brs over R MEUSE from incl BERG to incl BORGHAREN.

HAA - GROUND ROLE

28. Two btys 165 HAA Regt will be deployed by comd 9 AGRA, one bty under comd each 11 Med Regt and 67 Med Regt for ground shooting.
29. 2000 rds amn with proximity fuze will be allotted to each Bty. Special safety instrs for use of these fuzes will be issued separately.

SLs

30. Allotment see Appx 'A'.
31. One tp SLs from RA 8 Corps is being deployed in area OPHOVEN for sp 7 Armd Div.

MATTRESS

32. 1 Cdn (RP) Unit will be deployed by CCRA for sp fmns in turn. Six salvoes will be available for the whole op which will be allotted to fmns by the CCRA.

ADM

33. Amn allotment  
See Appx 'D' for allotment for planning.
34. Fmns will inform this HQ as soon as possible  
(a) Requirements of amn on ground in battle posns for sp opening phases.

...(b)/

(b) Requirements of 25 pr Smoke.

INTERCOMN

35. Nets

(a) CCRAs Comd Net

RA 7 Armd Div	}	Continuous watch at all times
RA 43 Div		
RA 52 (L) Div		
3 AGRA		
9 AGRA		
86 A tk Regt	}	As ordered by signals. 653 Air OP Sqn will remain in continuous watch wef 0800 hrs D day.
653 Air OP Sqn		
7 Svy Regt		
112 LAA Regt		

(b) CBO's Net (12 Set)

CBO 8 Corps  
CBO 12 Corps

(c) 7 Armd Div (12 Set Net)

CCRA 12 Corps  
RA 7 Armd Div (Control)  
RA 11 Armd Div

Nets (b) and (c) to open  
1200 hrs D - 1.

(d) Shelrep Net

CBO will arrange shelrep net and pass infm of frequencies  
and call signs to all fmns.

36. REPS

Reps will be provided as shown below and will join if not already  
joined by 1900 hrs D - 1.

Fmn providing	Allotted to	Remarks
RA 43 Div	102 US Div Arty XIII US Corps Arty	
RA 52 (L) Div	RA 43 Div	
RA 7 Armd Div	RA 11 Armd Div RA 52 (L) Div	
9 AGRA	XIII US Corps Arty RA 7 Armd Div RA 43 Div RA 52 (L) Div	
3 AGRA	RA 7 Armd Div (3) RA 43 Div RA 52 (L) Div	One for 147 Fd Regt in sp 8 Armd Bde
Close sp med Regts	with fmns they sp as required by them	
8 Corps Arty Gp (RA 11 Armd Div)	RA 7 Armd Div	
72 Med Regt	OPs as required by RA 7 Armd Div	
SL Tp (RA 8 Corps)	RA 7 Armd Div	

37. Allotment of Tgt Nos

			<u>Initial letters</u> <u>for groups</u>
RA 12 Corps	1000 - 1999		C
RA 7 Armd Div	7000 - 7999		F
RA 43 Div	8000 - 8999		L
RA 52 (L) Div	4000 - 4999		T
CBO	- -		B

147 Fd Regt is allotted the following sub allotment from  
Corps list 1900 - 1999 0

38. CABLE

Line diagram will be issued by 3 Coy 12 Corps Sigs.

GROUPING OF ARTY FOR OP 'BLACKCOCK'

1. Under op comd CCRA and grouped under comd CsRA and under comd fmhs for mov and adm:

RA 7 Armd Div

3 RHA  
5 RHA  
65 (NY) A Tk Regt  
15 LAA Regt  
A Flt 653 Air OP Sqn (with under  
comd two secs A Flt 652  
Air OP Sqn)  
One det B Tp 100 Radar Bty  
One Tp 344 Indep SL Bty

9 AGRA

11 Med Regt (in direct sp 43 Div)  
9 Med Regt  
67 Med Regt (in direct sp 52 Div)  
51 Hy Regt  
3 Super Hy Regt  
A Flt 658 Air OP Sqn  
Two Btys 165 HAA Regt  
(one under comd each 11 and 67  
Med Regts)

3 AGRA

13 Med Regt  
59 Med Regt  
107 Med Regt (in direct sp 7 Armd Div)  
Two btys 155 mm 59 Hy Regt  
A Flt 652 Air OP Sqn less two secs

RA 43 Div

6 Fd Regt  
94 Fd Regt  
112 Fd Regt  
179 Fd Regt  
59 A Tk Regt  
110 LAA Regt  
One Tp 344 Indep SL Bty  
One SP Bty 86 A Tk Regt  
(under comd 6 Gds Tk Bde)  
One det B Tp 100 Radar Bty  
C Flt 653 Air OP Sqn

RA 52 (L) Div

79 Fd Regt  
80 Fd Regt  
186 Fd Regt  
1 Mtn Regt  
54 A Tk Regt  
108 LAA Regt  
B Flt 653 Air OP Sqn  
One det B Tp 100 Radar Bty  
One tp 344 Indep SL Bty  
147 Fd Regt  
One SP Bty 86 A Tk Regt

2. Under comd CCRA for all purposes:

86 A Tk Regt less two SP btys  
112 LAA Regt  
7 Svy Regt less one bty  
653 Air OP Sqn less three flts  
CBO  
344 Indep SL Bty less three tps  
B Tp 100 Radar Bty less three dets

3. Additional arty in sp 12 Corps.

8 Corps Arty Gp grouped under comd CRA 11 Armd Div

4 RHA  
13 RHA  
72 Med Regt (in direct sp 7 Armd Div)  
53 Hy Regt less two btys 7.2" How  
Two btys 7.2" How 59 Hy Regt  
90 HAA Regt  
61 Med Regt  
151 Fd Regt  
One tp SLs

106 AA Bde

71 LAA Regt  
One bty 109 LAA Regt  
2 LAA/SL Bty  
157 AACR  
165 HAA Regt less three btys



Appx 'B' to RA 12 Corps  
Op Instr No.38

ALLOTMENT OF ARTY IN SP FMNS

NOTES

1. Fmns will have arty as shown below at priority call throughout the op for DF.

RA 7 Armd Div

3 RHA  
5 RHA  
107 Med Regt  
13 Med Regt  
72 Med Regt  
147 Fd Regt for phases A and B

RA 43 Div

94 Fd Regt  
112 Fd Regt  
179 Fd Regt  
9 Med Regt  
11 Med Regt

RA 52 (L) Div

79 Fd Regt  
80 Fd Regt  
186 Fd Regt  
1 Mtn Regt  
59 Med Regt  
67 Med Regt

CBO

Two btys 155 mm - 51 Hy Regt  
Two btys 155 mm - 59 Hy Regt  
3 Super Hy Regt  
Two btys HAA (9 AGRA)  
Two btys 155 mm }  
107 HAA Regt } 8 Corps  
61 Med Regt } Arty Gp

2. US Arty is supporting phases CROWN EAGLE FLEECE HART GLOBE and JUG by CB and HF on the brs over the ROER and approaches from the EAST.
3. CBO 12 Corps will fire prearranged bombards before phases ANGEL CROWN and HART to which all arty that can bear will be allotted.



ALLOTMENT OF ARTY IN SP FMNS

Phase and fm responsible	RA 7 Armd Div	RA 43 Div	RA 52 (L) Div	3 AGRA	9 AGRA	8 Corps Arty Gp	108 HAA
ANGEL 7 Armd Div	3 RHA 5 RHA 147 Fd Regt 6 Fd Regt			13 Med Regt 107 Med Regt 1 Bty 7.2" How Bty 155mm Gun		72 Med Regt Two btys 7.2" 4 RHA 13 RHA 90 HAA Regt	Two btys
BEAR 7 Armd Div	3 RHA 5 RHA 147 Fd Regt 6 Fd Regt		79 Fd Regt 80 Fd Regt 186 Fd Regt	13 Med Regt 59 Med Regt 107 Med Regt 1 Bty 7.2" How Bty 155mm Gun	9 Med Regt 11 Med Regt 67 Med Regt		Two btys
CROWN - B2 52 (L) Div	One fd regt	Div Arty 179 Fd Regt	Div Arty 147 Fd Regt	13 Med Regt 59 Med Regt 107 Med Regt 1 Bty 7.2" How	9 Med Regt 11 Med Regt 67 Med Regt One bty 7.2" How Two btys HAA		Two btys
DOLPHIN 7 Armd Div	3 RHA 5 RHA 6 Fd Regt		147 Fd Regt	13 Med Regt 107 Med Regt		4 RHA 13 RHA 25 Fd Regt 72 Med Regt One Hy Regt 61 Med Regt 90 HAA Regt	
EAGLE 52 (L) Div		Div Arty	Div Arty 147 Fd Regt	59 Med Regt	9 Med Regt 11 Med Regt 67 Med Regt Two btys 7.2" How Two btys HAA		

Phase and fmn responsible	RA 7 Armd Div	RA 43 Div	RA 52(L) Div	3 AGRA	9 AGRA	8 Corps Arty Gp
HART 43 Div		Div Arty 6 Fd Regt	79 Fd Regt 80 Fd Regt 186 Fd Regt 147 Fd Regt	13 Med Regt 59 Med Regt 107 Med Regt	9 Med Regt 11 Med Regt 67 Med Regt Two btys 7.2" How Two btys HAA	
FLEECE 52 (L) Div		Div Arty 6 Fd Regt	Div Arty 147 Fd Regt	13 Med Regt 59 Med Regt 107 Med Regt	9 Med Regt 11 Med Regt 67 Med Regt Two btys 7.2" How Two btys HAA	
JUG 43 Div		Div Arty 6 Fd Regt	79 Fd Regt 80 Fd Regt 186 Fd Regt 147 Fd Regt	Two med regts	9 Med Regt 11 Med Regt 67 Med Regt Two btys 7.2" How Two btys HAA	
GLOBE 7 Armd Div	3 RHA 5 RHA		79 Fd Regt 80 Fd Regt 186 Fd Regt 147 Fd Regt	Two med regts	Two med regts Two btys 7.2" How Two btys HAA	72 Med Regt 61 Med Regt 90 HAA Regt

See Diagram 2

INITIAL DEPLOYMENT AREAS AND MOVES'A' INITIAL DEPLOYMENT AREAS

FMN	AREA	QUALIFICATION
7 Armd Div arty incl 147 Fd Regt and 6 Fd Regt	area BORN 6472	Sp phase ANGEL one regt sp phase BEAR
43 Div arty	area STAHE 8066	Must reach phases CROWN and HART
52 (L) Div arty	area JABEFK 7466	BEAR - B2 and CROWN
<u>9 AGRA</u>		
9 Med Regt Remainder no change	EAST of SCHINVELD	BEAR - B2
<u>3 AGRA</u>		
13 Med Regt	area LIMBRICHT 6770	ANGEL - BEAR - B2 - CROWN
59 Med Regt	6966 - 7066	BEAR - B2 - CROWN
107 Med Regt	area LIMBRICHT	As for 13 Med Regt
Two btys 155 mm 59 Hy Regt	6966 - 7066	All phases except HART and JUG

'B' BETWEEN PHASES ANGEL - BEAR

FMN	UNIT	TO	TO COVER	MOVED BY
RA 7 Armd Div	One RHA regt	K	BEAR and CROWN	RA 7 Armd Div
RA 7 Armd Div	147 Fd Regt	K	BEAR and CROWN	RA 7 Armd Div
3 AGRA	107 Med Regt	K	BEAR and CROWN	RA 7 Armd Div

'C' DURING PHASE BEAR - C2

FMN	UNIT	TO	TO COVER	MOVED BY
8 Corps Arty Gp	4 RHA	V	DOLPHIN	RA 11 Armd Div
	13 RHA	N	DOLPHIN	RA 11 Armd Div
	Two btys 7.2" How	N	DOLPHIN	RA 11 Armd Div
	72 Med Regt	N	DOLPHIN and GLOBE	RA 11 Armd Div

/ 'D' AFTER

'D' AFTER PHASE CROWN AND BEFORE DOLPHIN - EAGLE

FMN	UNIT	TO	TO COVER	MOVED BY
RA 7 Armd Div	3 and 5 RHA and 6 Fd Regt move as required by CRA 7 Armd Div to sp DOLPHIN (6 Fd Regt NOT EAST of SCHILBERG)			
52 (L) Div	147 Fd Regt	O	DOLPHIN & EAGLE	RA 52 (L) Div
52 (L) Div	52 (L) Div arty	M	EAGLE	RA 52 (L) Div
9 AGRA	67 Med Regt	T	EAGLE FLEECE HART JUG and if possible GLOBE	52 (L) Div
9 AGRA	51 Hy Regt	T	" "	CCRA
9 AGRA	3 Super Hy Regt	R	" "	CCRA
3 AGRA	59 Med Regt	R	EAGLE and HART	CCRA

D2 AFTER PHASE DOLPHIN AND BEFORE HART

RA 43 Div      6 Fd Regt      43 Div Arty area      HART      RA 43 Div

'E' AFTER PHASE EAGLE AND BEFORE HART

FMN	UNIT	TO	TO COVER	MOVED BY
3 AGRA	13 Med Regt	Q	DOLPHIN FLEECE GLOBE	CCRA
3 AGRA	107 Med Regt	Q	" "	RA 7 Armd Div
RA 7 Armd Div	3 and 5 RHA moved by CRA 7 Armd Div as required to sp GLOBE.			
RA 52 (L) Div	147 Fd Regt	P	DOLPHIN FLEECE GLOBE	RA 52 (L) Div

'F' AFTER HART AND BEFORE FLEECE

FMN	UNIT	TO	TO COVER	MOVED BY
RA 43 Div	Div arty	W	JUG and FLEECE	RA 43 Div
RA 52 (L) Div	Div arty	S	" "	RA 52 (L) Div
9 AGRA	9 AGRA	M	JUG FLEECE GLOBE	CCRA Close sp regts by fmns
3 AGRA	59 Hy Regt less two btys	Q	JUG FLEECE GLOBE HART	CCRA

'G' AFTER FLEECE AND BEFORE JUG

- (a) It may be necessary to superimpose one regt from each 7 Armd Div and 52 (L) Div on 43 Div area
- (b) It may be necessary to move two med regts 3 AGRA to area KREUZRATH 8068.

14 Jan 45

Appx 'D' to RA 12 Corps Op  
Instr No 38

RA 7 Armd Div for phases ANGEL BEAR DOLPHIN GLOBE

Type	Basic allotment of regts	at	Total rds available
25 pr	Three Regts RA 8 Corps	400 rpg	28,800
25 pr	Three Regts RA 12 Corps	600 rpg	43,200
5.5 med	Two Regts RA 8 Corps	200 rpg	6,400
5.5 med	Three Regts RA 12 Corps	250 rpg	12,000
7.2 how	Two btys RA 8 Corps	100 rpg	800
7.2 how	Two btys RA 12 Corps	100 rpg	800
155 mm	Two btys RA 8 Corps	30 rpg	240
155 mm	Two btys RA 12 Corps	30 rpg	240
HAA	One Regt RA 8 Corps	300 rpg	7,200
HAA	Three tps RA 12 Corps	200 rpg	2,400
25 pr smk	7 Armd Div Arty		5,000

RA 52 (L) Div for phases CROWN EAGLE FLEECE

25 pr	Six Regts	800 rpg	115,200
5.5 med	Six Regts	200 rpg	19,200
7.2 how	One bty	50 rpg	200
HAA	Two btys	350 rpg	5,600 (incl 2,000 rds VT amn)
Mtn	One Regt	300 rpg	7,200
25 pr smk	52 (L) Div Arty		5,000

RA 43 Div for phases HART and JUG

25 pr	Six Regts	800 rpg	115,200
5.5 med	Six Regts	200 rpg	19,200
7.2 how	One bty	50 rpg	200
HAA	Two btys	350 rpg	5,600 (incl 2000 rds VT amn)
25 pr smk	43 Div Arty		10,000

CBO for whole op

5.5 med	Two Regts RA 8 Corps	100 rpg	3,200
5.5 med	Six Regts RA 12 Corps	100 rpg	9,600
7.2 how	Two btys RA 8 Corps	100 rpg	800
7.2 how	Two btys RA 12 Corps	50 rpg	400
155 gun	Two btys RA 8 Corps	50 rpg	400
155 gun	Four btys RA 12 Corps	50 rpg	800
Super Hy	3 Super HY Regt	80 rpg	480 (all natures)
HAA	One Regt RA 8 Corps	80 rpg	1,920
HAA	Five Tps RA 12 Corps	80 rpg	1,600

ACK

BIA





OP "BLACKCOCK"

EXTRACTS FROM 7 ARMD DIV OP ORDER

4. Additional Tps

The following additional tps come under comd 7 Armd Div for the op.

8 Armd Bde less SRY and one coy 12 KRRC

One Bde 52 (L) Div

147 Fd Regt

Two Pls Corps Tps RE

222 Assault Sqn RE less one tp, and incl  
two assault brs

One SP Bty 86 A tk Regt

One Sqn IOTHIANs less one tp

One TCL

One Regt KANGAROOS less two tps

To pass to  
comd 52 (L) Div  
on completion  
of Phase BEAR.

One Sqn IOTHIANs less one tp

One tp 222 Assault Sqn RE incl two Assault brs

One Sqn CROCODILES

Two tps KANGAROOS

280 Fd Coy RE

One tp 344 SL Bty

"A" Flight 653 AOP Sqn

One det 100 RADAR Bty

Two TCLs

6 Fd Regt - on completion phase DOLPHIN passes to under  
comd 43 Div.

INTENTION

5. 7 Armd Div will

- (a) Seize and establish firm base area ECHT 6980 - SCHILBERG 7079 and open up as quickly as possible class 40 route SITTARD - SCHILBERG - Codeword ANGEL.
- (b) Seize area WALDFEUCHT 7775 - BOCKET 7874 - KONINGSBOSCH 7574 - Codeword BEAR.
- (c) Establish firm base in area MONTFORT - Codeword DOLPHIN.
- (d) Subsequently to destroy all enemy in area POSTERHOLT 8181 - ST ODILIENBERG 7884 - LINNE 7485 - MAASBRACHT 7085 - Codeword GLOBE.

.../METHOD

METHOD

6. Grouping

<u>22 Armd Bde</u>	<u>131 Bde</u>	<u>8 Armd Bde</u>
5 DG	1/5 QUEENS	4/7 DG
8 H	2 DEVON	13/18 H
5 R TANKS	9 DLI	12 KRRC less one coy
1 RB	1 R TANKS	One Bde 52 (L) Div
260 Bty NY	Sqn less one tp	147 Fd Regt
	LOTHIANS	Two pls Corps Tps RE
	One Sqn CROCODILES	222 Assault Sqn RE less one
	258 Bty NY	tp and incl two Asslt Bns
	Two tps KANGAROOS	One SP Bty 86 A tk Regt
	One TCL	One Sqn IOTHIANs less one tp
		One Regt KANGAROOS less two tps
		One TCL

Note (1) One Armd Regt and one coy 1 RB from 22 Armd Bde subsequently to revert to Div reserve - see para 9(a) below.

(2) One Bn 131 Bde on completion of ANGEL to pass to comd 22 Armd Bde - see para 9(c) below.

7. Tasks - 131 Bde.

- (a) To establish brhead across stream area 667764 and capture DIETEREN 6777 - Codeword ANGEL I.
- (b) To seize and establish firm base area ECHT 6980 - SCHILBERG 7079 - Codeword ANGEL II.
- (c) To clear SUSTEREN and assist RE to open class 40 route SITTARD - SCHILBERG - Codeword ANGEL III.

8. Tasks - 8 Armd Bde

As soon as class 40 route SITTARD - SCHILBERG has been opened 8 Armd Bde will be called fwd and will adv via SCHILBERG to seize area WALDFEUCHT - BOCKET 7874 - KONINGSBOSCH 7574 - Codeword BEAR.

On completion of this phase 8 Armd Bde will pass to comd 52 (L) Div.

9. Tasks - 22 Armd Bde.

- (a) To maintain firm base area NIEUWSTADT 6872 - HOLTUM 6573 with one Armd Regt and one coy 1 RB. This force will remain under comd 22 Armd Bde until commencement of DOLPHIN when it will pass to under comd Div.
- (b) To cover bridging up to incl MILL 673740 and if situation favourable as far as incl br 675745.
- (c) With two Armd Regts, 1 RB less one coy, one bn 131 Bde, to pass through 131 Bde to seize and secure firm base area MONTFORT 7482. Codeword DOLPHIN. This phase will NOT commence until ordered by this HQ.
- (d) Subsequently (after regrouping if necessary) to destroy all enemy in area POSTERHOLT 8181 - ST ODILLENBERG 7884 - LINNE 7485 - MAASBRACHT 7085 - Codeword GLOBE.

.../Tasks

10. Tasks - 11 H

11 H operating under comd Div will

- (a) Maintain one sqn in area ROOSTEREN 6577 to prevent enemy infiltration between R MEUSE and JULIANA Canal.
- (b) Less sqn in (a) above adv to recede following lines  
PUTBROEK 7780 - MONTFORT 7482 - LINNE 7485.  
POSTERHOLT 8181 - ST ODILLENBERG 7884.
- (c) If intact to destroy br at ST ODILLENBERG. RE as required will be placed under comd 11 H for this phase.

11. RA

- (a) Under comd CRA and in sp of phases as detailed by CRA

3 RHA  
5 RHA  
147 Fd Regt (for phase ANGEL and phase BEAR only)  
B tp 344 SL Bty  
6 Fd Regt (passes to 43 Div on completion phase DOLPHIN).

- (b) In res under comd CRA

NY less two Btys  
15 LAA Regt  
One det B tp 100 RADAR Bty  
"A" Flt 653 AOP Sqn

- (c) In sp Elts of 3 AGRA, 9 AGRA, 8 Corps Arty Gp (incl SIs) will be in sp of phases as detailed by CRA.

12. RE

- (a) For ANGEL - 621 Fd Sqn and two pls 280 Fd Coy in sp 131 Bde.

- (b) For ANGEL - 4 Fd Sqn, 280 Fd Coy less two pls and tp 222 Asslt Sqn RE incl two Asslt brs under comd CRE for opening SITTARD - SCHILBERG Rd.

- (c) For DOLPHIN - 4 Fd Sqn in sp 22 Armd Bde.

- (d) CRE will be responsible for establishing and maintaining the following routes :-

(i) SITTARD - ROERMOND

(ii) ECHT 6979 - BOCKET 7874

13. D Day and H Hour

Will be notified later.

14. Timings

ANGEL. - Start first hour D day.

BEAR - As soon as class 40 route SITTARD - SCHILBERG has been opened. Probable time 1600 hrs D plus 1.

DOLPHIN - D plus 3.

15. Preliminary Op

131 Bde will capture BAKENHOVEN before first light, 13 Jan. All orders for this op have been issued separately.

16. Traffic

- (a) Traffic arrangements for whole op under Div control.
- (b) A conference will be held at this HQ 130900A. Bdes, RA, RE, & Sigs and A/Q will attend bringing details of moves, routes, etc which will be required D day, D plus 1, D plus 2. It is realised that these details cannot be completely firm at this stage, but should be sufficiently firm to enable a traffic plan to be worked out.

INTERCOMN

- 19. (a) Main div HQ moves to LIMBRICHT 14 JAN.
- (b) Rear HQ remains present location.
- (c) 22 Armd Bde moves to OBBICHT 12 JAN.
- (d) 131 Bde moves to BORN 12 JAN.
- (e) 8 Armd Bde moves to SITTARD area 14 JAN.

20. Wireless Silence

- (a) Bde nets will minimise until H hr.
- (b) Thereafter full wireless.
- (c) A special Traffic Control net will operate for the op - details later.

OP "BLACKCOCK"

Extracts from OP INSTR NO 4

10. RE

excl TUDDERN (X rds 714699) - HONGEN 7370 -  
SAEFFELEN 7571 - BRAUNSRATH 8174

## INTENTION

13. 52 (L) Div will

- (a) open the rd SITTARD - HEINSBERG  
(b) Clear the enemy from the WEST bank of R ROER between incl  
HEINSBERG and excl POSTERHOLT.

## METHOD

14. PHASE CROWN ONE

(Capture of area BREBEREN - SATTFELN - HONGEN and SCHALBRUCH 7173 - HAVERT 7172 - ISENBRUCH 6973 and open rd TUDDERN 7169 - HONGEN).

15. Tps Comd: Brig C.N. BARCLAY, DSO.

Under comd

- (a) 5 HLI from 157 Inf Bde with under comd )  
one sqn SRY ) Revert Comd 157 Inf  
one tp FIAALS ) Bde on crossing rd  
one tp CROCODILES ) SAFFELLEN - HAVER.

(b) 156 Inf Bde

one; sqn SRY

In sp

one sqn FLAILS  
one sqn less one tp CROCODILES  
554 Fd Coy RE with under comd one tp 16 Aslt Sqn RE  
and two aslt brs  
A coy (4.2-in Mortars) 7 MANCH  
one MMG coy 7 MANCH

16. Div Res

- (a) 157 Inf Bde less one bn  
SRY less two sqns  
54 A Tk Regt RA  
one MIG coy 7 MANCH  
one pl 4.2-in Mortars 7 MANCH

- (b) One coy 157 Bde will assist in opening rd TUDDERN - HONGEN.

- (c) One bn 157 Bde will be at one hrs notice to move after capture of HONGEN; remainder at two hrs notice from same time

17. Objectives

- First To secure a br hd about LIND 7272 - STEIN 7371 - HEILDER 7471, with two brs across the stream about 727777 (Tower br) and about 725718 (RICHMOND br).
- Second SCHALLERUCH 7173 - ISENERUCH 7072 - HAVERT 7271 to clear the LEFT flank.
- Third HONGEN - to open rd SITTARD - SAEFFELLEN.
- Fourth SAEFFELLEN - to open rd SAEFFELLEN - X rds 777728.
- Fifth BROICHOVEN 7671 - X rds 774707 - BREBEREN - NACHBARHEID 7772 - to open rd KIEVELBERG - BREBEREN.

18. Timings

- (a) CROWN ONE is scheduled to start at 0630 hrs D plus 2.
- (b) The best conditions for this attack are that tps of 8 Armd Bde are on or approaching their final objectives in PHASE BEAR.
- (c) In the event of there being some delay in PHASE BEAR, it may be necessary to postpone the start of PHASE CROWN ONE by some hrs. Postponement will be indicated by msg CROWN ONE back ..... hrs all timings being taken from 0630 hrs D plus 2.
- (d) If there is little chance of full success in PHASES ANGEL and BEAR, PHASE CROWN ONE will take place at a time to be decided in accordance with the development of the situation.

19. Arty To follow.

20. RE Tasks of Div RE (less 554 Fd Coy RE)

- (a) Open the route TUDDERN - SAEFFELLEN - HEINSBERG to Class 40 traffic.
- (b) Sp 156 Bde Gp.

21. Assembly

- (a) All tps under comd and in sp 156 Inf Bde less

arty  
MMGs and Mortars  
5 HLI  
FLAILS  
CROCODILES

will move into 156 Inf Bde present area by 1100 hrs D plus 1.

- (b) 156 Inf Bde and att tps will move from present locations to assembly areas TUDDERN - BROEKSITTARD 7068 - KOLIBERG 6967 - LEIJENBROEK 6866 - HILLENBURG 7266 - GROOTDOENRADE 7164 - OORSBEEK 7162 by 1800 hrs D plus 1.

- (c) Routes - conc areas to assembly areas

- (i) From 156 Inf Bde area - NUTH 6959 - AMSTENRADE 7361.
- (ii) From HOBBEIRADE 6662 (CROCODILES) and GELEEN (FLAILS)
- (FIRST) HOBBEIRADE - rd junc 645605 - KRUIS 647581 - NUTH - AMSTENRADE. Timings as required by 156 Bde.

.../(SECOND) ..

(SECOND) GELEEN - rd junc 677674 - LEIJENBROEK 6366. Tail to be clear of rd junc 677674 by 1145 hrs.

- (d) Tp-carrying tpt will be provided to lift inf bns from conc area to assembly areas.

22. Div Res

- (a) SRY less two sqns will move to area WEHR 7267 by 1800 hrs D plus 1. Route - AMSTENRADE - X rds 713644 - WEHR.
- (b) 54 A Tk Regt RA will remain present locations ready to move one bty at a time starting with btys out of the line.

PHASE CROWN TWO

23. (Move of 52 Recce Regt and 7 MANCH less one coy to area WALDFEUCHT - BOCKET - KONINGSBOSCH and opening of rd SAEFFELLEN - BOCKET).

24. Tps Comd: Lt Col J.B.A. HANKEY, OBE, 52 Recce Regt with under comd

52 Recce Regt  
7 MANCH less one MMG coy and one pl 4.2-in Mortars  
in sp 241 Fd Coy RE - one tp FLAILS - on passing SAEFFELLEN.

25. Task Open rd SAEFFELLEN - BOCKET.

26. Role

- (a) 7 MANCH less one MMG coy and one pl 4.2-in Mortars will conc under comd 155 Inf Bde on arrival in area WALDFEUCHT - BOCKET - KONINGSBOSCH.
- (b) 52 Recce Regt will sp 8 Armd Bde by protecting the LEFT flank about the wooded area NORTH of WALDFEUCHT - HAAREN.

27. Assembly

- (a) 52 Recce Regt will move to assembly area HILLENBERG 7266 between 0900 hrs and 1200 hrs D plus 2.  
Orders for move FWD from ASSEMBLY area will be issued by Div HQ by msg CROWN TWO .... hrs.

- (b) Routes to assembly area

VALKENBURG 6553 - rd junc 668544 - rd junc 676575 - NUTH - AMSTENRADE - HOUTENDOUVE.

- (c) 7 MANCH less one MMG coy and one pl 4.2-in Mortars will assemble along and off rd GANGEIT - SITTARD on completion of tasks and will move fwd under orders 52 Recce Regt.
- (d) Route fwd from assembly area WEHR - SITTARD - TUDDERN.

28. Arty To follow.

PHASE EAGLE

29. (Capture of area BRAUNSRATH - HAAREN)

30. Ger.

This PHASE is divided into THREE, PHASE EAGLE ONE is the preliminary move of 52 Div Arty. PHASE EAGLE TWO will not start without its sp.

PHASE EAGLE ONE

31. Comd: Brig L.B.D. BURNS, DSO, OBE, MC, CRA.

32. Tps 52 Div Arty.

33. Task

Move to gun area NORTH of rd BREBEREN - SAEFFELN to sp EAGLE TWO on orders from Div HQ, probably during night D plus 2 / D plus 3.

34. Route TUDDERN - SAEFFELN.

PHASE EAGLE TWO

35. Tps Comd: Brig E.L. PRIOR PALMER, DSO.

Under comd

8 Armd Bde  
147 Fd Regt RA  
Two pls C Tps RE  
One aslt sqn RE less one tp and  
incl two aslt brs  
One SP bty 86 A Tk Regt RA  
One sqn less one tp FLAILS  
one tol  
155 Inf Bde with under comd 7 MANCH (less  
one coy and one 4.2-in Mortar pl  
remaining under comd 157 Inf Bde)

In sp

52 Recce Regt and Div Arty.

36. Task

Seize area BRAUNSRATH - HAAREN and clear woods to the NORTH.

PHASE EAGLE THREE

37. Tps Either 156 or 157 Inf Bdes

with in sp one sqn and one tp FLAILS  
one sqn CROCODILES

under comd one Armd Regt

38. Move

On orders from Div HQ, probably NOT before night D plus 3 / D plus 4.

39. Tasks

- (a) To come up on the RIGHT flank of either 155 Inf Bde or 8 Armd Bde SOUTH of or astride the rd SELSTEN - HEINSBERG.
- (b) To secure SELSTEN - APHOVEN if ordered.

40. Arty To follow



41. RE Task of Div RE:

- (a) To open the route SAEFFELLEN - X rds 809739 to Class 40 traffic.
- (b) Sp inf bde gp.

PHASE FLEECE

42. (Capture of area KARKEN 8379 - KEMPEN 8578 - HEINSBERG 8575 - KIRCHHOVEN 8376).

43. Tps

- (a) Armour 8 Armd Bde  
52 Recce Regt
- (b) Inf RIGHT 156 or 157 Inf Bdes  
LEFT 155 Inf Bde
- (c) Arty Corps arty in sp.

44. Task

- (a) Seize area KARKEN - KEMPEN - HEINSBERG - KIRCHHOVEN sp by 8 Armd Bde, but if this area is secured by 8 Armd Bde in adv of the inf bdes, the latter will relieve 8 Armd Bde in the area.
- (b) 52 Recce Regt will protect the LEFT flank during this PHASE and will gain contact with 7 Armd Div at POSTERHOLT 8181.
- (c) 52 Recce Regt will probably be required to secure the brs over the stream running between incl HINGEN 8380 - 805812.

45. This PHASE cannot be planned in detail now and it will NOT be started without ref to Div HQ.

Detailed orders will be issued on completion of PHASE EAGLE.

46. RE

Tasks of Div RE

- (a) open route X rds 809739 to HEINSBERG.
- (b) sp PHASE FLEECE.

INTERCOMN

49. HQ

- (a) 12 CORPS .... 635619 moving later to SITTARD
- (b) 7 Armd Div .... 653671 moving to LIMBRICHT wef 14 Jan.
- (c) 43 (W) Div .... BRUNSSUM 7662.
- (d) 52 (L) Div .... NUTH 6959 moving later to MONSTERGELEEN
- (e) 155 Inf Bde .... 597560
- (f) 156 Inf Bde .... 682562
- (g) 157 Inf Bde .... 688684
- (h) 8 Armd Bde .... area SITTARD wef 14 Jan.

} later locations will be issued separately.

50. Liaison

- (a) 52 (L) Div will maintain LO (with WT) with HQ 7 Armd Div.
- (b) 155 Bde will maintain LO with HQ 156 Bde until conclusion Phase CROWN TWO.
- (c) 157 Bde and 52 Recce Regt will maintain LO with HQ 52 (L) Div.

53. WT working

- (a) Minimise until committed to battle.
- (b) Flails and Crocodiles will break wireless silence when fmm, unit, etc which they are supporting does so.

54. Allocation of Tcls

156 Bde - one  
HQ 52 (L) Div- one

52 (L) Div

(Appx "D")

Op "BLACKCOCK"

13 Jan 45.

LIABILITIES OF FMNS TOWARDS EACH OTHER

(Issued with Op Instr No 4)

1. Transfer of 8 Armd Bde Gp

Comd of 8 Armd Bde Gp will pass from 7 Armd Div to 52 (L) Div on orders 12 Corps at about H plus one hr in Phase CROWN. If Phase BEAR successful Q Maint of 8 Armd Bde Gp for night D plus 2/3 remains the responsibility of 7 Armd Div.

2. Transfer of KANGAROOS

Comd of 1 Cdn Armd Personnel Carrier Regt passes from 7 Armd Div to 52 (L) Div with 8 Armd Bde Gp as in para 1.

52 (L) Div will release one sqn of 1 Cdn Armd Personnel Carrier Regt to under comd 43 Div immediately Phase CROWN is completed.

3. Transfer of Corps Tps RE

Two pls C Tps RE under comd 8 Armd Bde revert to comd 12 Corps on completion Phase CROWN.

One fd coy C Tps RE from 12 Corps to under comd 43 Div morning of D plus 4.

4. BREBEREN

During Phase CROWN, 52 (L) Div will seize the following area which lies partly within op bdy of 43 Div :-

All incl 52 (L) Div - rd at 777724 - rd and track junc 782721 - rd and track junc 779717 - 780712 - rd junc 780709 - rd thence to X rds 779708 - X tracks 777705 - X rds 774707 - NORTH end of cutting 766709 - rd and track junc 765712 - rd at 768716 - track at 773723.

43 Div are responsible for opening and maintaining the rd HASTENRATH - BREBEREN and for making and maintaining the crossing at 777711 in BREBEREN but it is possible that 52 (L) Div may make this crossing during Op CROWN.

43 Div will take over this brhd on morning of D plus 3 or as soon as possible thereafter.

5. Running Rights

(a) 43 Div will grant 52 (L) Div running rights on the rd AMSTENRADE 7261 - SCHINVELD 7664 - GANGEIT 7767. 52 (L) Div will obtain timings from 43 Div for any moves of more than 40 vehs on this rd.

(b) As the situation develops 52 (L) Div will grant 43 Div running rights on the rds near LAFFELD 8272 and facilities for assembly and forming up in Op JUG II, but any clearance of mines involved will be the responsibility of 43 Div in both cases.

6. Harassing Fire

During night D plus 1/2, 43 Div will carry out harassing fire on enemy fwd localities along the whole length of their front so that 52 (L) Div's similar action should not prejudice surprise.

7. Junc pts 7 Armd Div/52(L) Div

7 Armd Div and 52 (L) Div will make contact under arrangements made mutually at the following junc pts in succession :-

- (i) Rd junc 699730
- (ii) Rd junc 727757
- (iii) Rd junc 736777
- (iv) X tracks 768788

8. 43 Div will provide mov lt over rd BEEK - SITTARD for 7 Armd Div on night D plus 1/2 until at latest 0600 hrs D plus 2. Thereafter 7 Armd Div will obtain agreement of 52 (L) Div to any exposure on this rd.

## OP "BLACKCOCK"

15 Jan 45

Extracts from 43 Div Op Instr No. 33. Order of Battle 43 Div

Under Comd: 6 Gds Tk Bde  
 (340 A tk Bty)  
 C Sqn 141 RAC  
 B Sqn W Dgns  
 16 Aslt Sqn RE, less one tp  
 Sqn 1 Cdn APC Regt (from D + 3)  
 6 Fd Regt (from D + 3)  
 Tp 344 SL Bty  
 C Flt 653 Air OP Sqn  
 Det 100 Radar Unit  
 Two Tcls  
 263 Fd Coy RE (from am D + 4)

In sp: 12 Corps Arty Gp (incl 3 and 9 AGsRA,  
 RA 52 Div and  
 US Arty Gps)  
 Det 1141 US Combat Engr Gp

INTENTION

4. 43 Div will destroy enemy within bdys of the Div SOUTH of R ROER.

METHOD5. Summary

- (a) 129 Inf Bde will secure, with one Bn, the vicinity of the crossing of the obstacle belt SOUTH of BREBEREN for the launching of 130 Bde's operation.
- (b) Thereafter, Bdes will undertake phases in following sequences :-

130 Inf Bde - HART  
 129 Inf Bde - JUG I  
 130 Inf Bde - JUG II  
 214 Inf Bde - KETTLE

6. BREBEREN Bridgehead

(a) Comd: Comd 129 Inf Bde

(b) Tps: 5 WILTS  
 Two coys 4 SOM LI  
 Sqn 4 Tk GREN GDS )  
 Tp 340 A tk Bty SP )  
 A Sqn 43 Recce Regt (until H hr for HART)  
 B Sqn W Dgns less two tps  
 260 Fd Coy RE  
 16 Aslt Sqn RE less two tps  
 Pl A Coy 8 Mx  
 Tp 235 A tk Bty  
 Det 129 Fd Amb

In sp: at least one fd regt

.../(c)

(c) Tasks

- (i) To secure a bridgehead to cover the forming up and start line of leading Bn 130 Inf Bde in HART. Bridgehead will include: NACHBARHEIDE 7772 - Pt 73.8 786717 - Pt 71.5 788712 - X rds 787708 - rd junc 783703.
- (ii) To open route HASTENRATH - BREBEREN for wheeled traffic, incl est class 40 crossing and a separate crossing for inf to WEST of existing rd br.
- (iii) To maintain contact by car patrol with 52 Div on LEFT.

(d) Assembly Area

Areas 3 and 16 Trace B available from 1200 hrs D + 2.  
Rally area for W Dgns - MERKLEBEEK.

(e) Timings

Force will be ready to take over BREBEREN from 52 Div from first light D + 3 on orders Comd 43 Div.

7. HART

(a) Comd: Comd 130 Inf Bde

- (b) Tps: 130 Inf Bde  
4 Tk COLDM GDS )  
Tp 340 A tk Bty )  
A Sqn 43 Recce Regt (from H hr HART)  
C Sqn 141 RAC  
B Sqn W Dgns  
Minimum two tps 1 Cdn APC  
233 A tk Bty  
Two tps 333 A tk Bty  
Pl 553 Fd Coy RE  
C Coy 8 Mx  
Two pls D Coy 8 Mx  
One Tcl

in sp: Seven Fd Regts  
Six Med Regts  
Two Hy Btys  
PEPPERPOT Gp

(c) Tasks

- (i) Capture and hold - HARZELT,  
SCHIERWALDENRATH,  
PUTT,  
WALDENRATH.
- (ii) Maintain contact by car patrol with 52 Div on LEFT.

(d) Assembly Areas

- (i) Areas - 14, 2, 4, ) available from 1200 hrs  
15, 3, 16, 5 ) D + 3.

... /(ii)

- (ii) Rally areas for sp arms  
reverting from comd :- 141 RAC AREA 3  
W Dgns AREA 3  
APC AREA 5

(e) Timing

Leading Bn will be prepared to cross start line  
for attack on HARZEIT at 0800 hrs D + 4.

8. JUG I

- (a) Comd: Comd 129 Inf Bde

- (b) Tps: 129 Inf Bde  
4 Tk GREN GDS )  
Tp 340 A tk Bty )  
A Sqn 43 Recce Regt (from H hr JUG I and to revert  
C Sqn 141 RAC to comd 130 Bde on capture of  
B Sqn W Dgns UETTERATH)  
Minimum two tps 1 Cdn APC  
Two tps 333 A tk Bty (from 130 Bde)  
235 A tk Bty  
Pl 260 Fd Coy  
A Coy 8 Mx  
Two Pls D Coy 8 Mx  
One Tcl (from 130 Bde)

in sp: Eight Fd Regts  
Five Mod Regts  
Two Hy Btys  
PEPPERPOT Gp

(c) Tasks:

- (i) Capture and hold

{ SCHEIFENDAHL  
{ ERPEN  
{ SCHLEIDEN

{ STRAETEN  
{ BLAUENSTEIN 7969  
{ Rd and track junc 860687

UETTERATH

- (ii) Maintain contact with 52 (1) Div.

- (iii) Consolidate UETTERATH into strong bn locality.

(d) Assembly

- (i) Areas available from 1000 hrs D + 5 as follows :-

3, 5, 9, 16, 28, 31, 34.

- (ii) Rally areas for sp arms reverting from comd :-

C Sqn 141 RAC 12  
B Sqn W Dgns 12  
APC 5

(e) Timings

Plans will be based on attack on SCHEIFENDAHL starting  
first light D + 6.

.../9.

9. JUG II

(a) Comd Comd 130 Inf Bde

(b) Tps As in Phase HART

NOTE: (i) A Sqn 43 Recce Rgt comes under comd on completion of capture of UETTERATH by 129 Bde.

(ii) C Sqn 141 RAC } come under comd on arrival  
B Sqn W Dgns } in rally areas after JUG I.  
Two tps APC }

(c) Tasks

(i) Capture and occupation of :-

SCHAFHAUSEN  
GREBBEN  
DREMMEN

(ii) Exploitation to line of LINDERN - HEINSBERG rly and to DREMMERBUSCH 791735.

(iii) Relieve Bn 129 Bde in general area SCHLEIDEN -  
X rds 859714 - ERPEN.

(d) Assembly In addition to own localities as occupied at end of phase HART.

12, 31, 9, 10 and 23 available from time to be notified depending on progress on JUG I.

Rally for Sp arms reverting:

Sqn 141 RAC	21
W Dgns	22
APC	1

(e) Timings Plans will be based on JUG II beginning morning D + 7.

10. KETTLE

(a) Comd: Comd 214 Inf Bde

(b) Tps 214 Inf Bde  
3 Tk SG )  
Tp 340 A tk Bty )  
C Sqn 141 RAC  
B Sqn W Dgns  
Minimum two tps 1 Cdn APC  
One tp 333 A tk Bty  
236 A tk Bty  
Pl 204 Fd Coy  
B Coy 8 Mx  
Two Pls D Coy 8 Mx  
One tcl (from 130 Bde)

In sp

Seven Fd Regts  
Five Med Regts  
Two HAA Btys  
PEPPERPOT Gp  
Arty XIII US Corps



11. FDL

- (a) 43 Rocce (less one sqn) take over SERVICES WOOD from Bn 129 Bde on 16 Jan.
- (b) 214 Inf Bde will assume comd of SERVICES WOOD sector from 2359 hrs 16 Jan.

13. RA

(a) Arty available

- (i) In sp 129 Bde D + 3 - details later.
- (ii) In sp 130 Bde Op HART - Seven Fd Regts, six Med Regts, two Hy Btys (7.2), two HAA Btys.
- (iii) In sp 129 Bde Op JUG I - eight Fd Regts, five Med Regts, two Hy Btys (7.2), two HAA Btys.
- (iv) In sp 130 Bde Op JUG II - as above.
- (v) In sp 214 Bde Op KETTLE - as above.

(b) Amn available

- (i) HE - 25 pr 115,200 rds  
5.5 19,200 rds  
7.2 200 rds  
HAA 5,600 rds (incl 2000 rds V tracer)
- (ii) Smoke 25 pr 15,000 rds

(c) Direct Sp

- (i) 43 Div Arty normal.
- (ii) 11 Med Regt is in direct sp and will be in direct sp of each bde in turn.

(d) Moves

43 Div Arty will move to area BIRGDEN - SCHIERWALDENRATH - HARZALT between HART and JUG I to be in action by 1800 hrs D + 5 in this area.

(e) CB

Hostile btys are to be bombarded before phases HART and JUG I.

(f) HF

US arty are to be engaged on brs over R WURM and rd juncs area SCHLEIDEN and UETTERATH.

LAA

Normal. AP tps will be replaced by towed tps at discretion of CO 110 LAA Regt to enable SP tps to engage PEPPERPOT tasks, rejoining bdes on completion of this task.

SLs

One tp 344 SL Bty will provide mov lt to enable bdes to move into and out of assembly areas.

14. RE

Tasks

(a) Rd Comms

- (i) Under 129 Bde. BREBEREN crossings - see above.
- (ii) Develop route BREBEREN - WALDENRATH behind adv of 130 Bde in HART.
- (iii) Open two wheeled routes and one cl 40 track route between present FDL and Rd in (ii) above as soon after HART as possible.
- (iv) Open one wheeled route from SCHIERWALDENRATH to X rds 833731 prior to JUG I.
- (v) Open rd APOHOVEN - SCHEIFFENDAHL - STRAETEN and a route from SCHEIFFENDAHL to SCHLEIDEN to UETTERATH behind adv of 129 Bde in JUG I.
- (vi) Open rd GEILENKIRCHEN - STRAETEN and rd TRIPSRAETH - BLAUENSTEIN - UETTERATH on completion of JUG I.
- (vii) Open a route as selected by Comd 130 Bde from APOHOVEN - SCHAFHAUSEN - DREMMEN in JUG II.
- (viii) Routes for KETTLE - later.
- (b) Assist CRA in clearance and access routes to gun area PUTT - WALDENRATH - BIRGDEM - SCHIERWALDENRATH.

15. CA

- (a) Policy is to leave as many German civs in the villages as possible.

Handbills for these civs are being issued separately together with instructions for their use. They should be circulated within villages as early as possible.

- (b) Undesirable or suspect civs who must be evacuated will be returned down normal PW channels. These numbers must be kept to a minimum.

Intercomm

- 16. Tac HQ 43 Div opens MINDERGANGELT 767666 0700 hrs D + 4.  
Main HQ remains present location.